This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or …

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or …

, the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of the induced coalition production economy coincides with the core of the balanced …-jobbing. -- Coalition production economy ; transferable utility game ; core ; Walrasian equilibrium ; Walrasian equilibrium without double …

coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that …

We study linearly weighted versions of the least core and the (pre)nucleolus and investigatethe reduction possibilities … dual game. Our main results imply, for example, that if the core of the game is not empty, all dually inessential … core and the per-capita (pre)nucleolus from the dual game. This could lead to the design of polynomial time algorithms for …

In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the most popular …

We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in … sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable … set in such games. -- Core ; Hedonic Games ; Monotonicity ; Stable Sets …

merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility …