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Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 4 (2009) 1, pp. 45-88

function, mapping payoff type profiles to outcomes, can be robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699160

Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

This essay is the introduction for a collection of papers by the two of us on "Robust Mechanism Design" to be published …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251220

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Benjamin; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

We study how the outcomes of a private-value first price auction can vary with bidders' information, for a fixed distribution of private values. In a two bidder, two value, setting, we characterize all combinations of bidder surplus and revenue that can arise, and identify the information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895653

Robust virtual implementation

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) 1, pp. 45-88

function, mapping payoff type profiles to outcomes, can be robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599415

Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Takahashi, Satoru - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012

We consider the efficient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modelling interdependent preferences distinguishing between "payoff types" and "belief types" and report a characterization of when the efficient allocation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416099

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545755

Robust virtual implementation

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) 1

function, mapping payoff type profiles to outcomes, can be robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515737

Strategic Distinguishability with an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007

payoff type profiles to outcomes -- can be robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593300

Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005

identify conditions where, if robust implementation is possible, it is possible in a direct mechanism. We identify conditions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593322

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively … mechanism. The contraction property essentially requires that the interdependence is not too large. In a linear signal model … property is also necessary for robust implementation in any mechanism. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593470

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