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Strategy-Proof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies : A Note
Deb, Rajat; Ohseto, Shinji - 2000
Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014179633
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Efficiency, welfare, and political competition
Bierbrauer, Felix; Boyer, Pierre C. - 2014
We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share-maximizers. They can propose any policy that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358277
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Separation of Powers, Political Competition and Efficient Provision of Public Goods
Boukouras, Aristotelis; Koufopoulos, Kostas - 2010
In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to become legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining politicians' behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions about the level of the public good. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014208460
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Law Versus Regulation : A Political Economy Model of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy
Boyer, Marcel; Porrini, Donatella - 2001
We analyze the conditions under which a legal intervention can be compared to a regulatory framework in the context of a political economy model of environmental policy. The first part of the paper describes the characteristics of the different instruments we want to compare: first, an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014137440
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Law Versus Regulation : A Political Economy Model of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy
Boyer, Marcel; Porrini, Donatella - 2001
We analyze the conditions under which a legal intervention can be compared to a regulatory framework in the context of a political economy model of environmental policy. The first part of the paper describes the characteristics of the different instruments we want to compare: first, an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014139756
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Why voting? : a welfare analysis ; conference paper
Drexl, Moritz; Kleiner, Andreas - 2013 - This version: July 2013
qualified majority voting. Our result shows that using a VCG mechanism is not superior to voting in general and justifies the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342115
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Quadratic Voting : How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy
Lalley, Steven - 2017
Can mechanism design save democracy? We propose a simple design that offers a chance: individuals pay for as many votes … value of changing the outcome. A variety of analysis and evidence suggests that this still-nascent mechanism has significant ….The online appendix for "Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy" may be found here: 'http …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975457
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A Political Reciprocity Mechanism
Pongou, Roland - 2020
This paper considers the problem faced by a political authority that has to design a legislative mechanism that ….g., legislators) are induced to display reciprocal and pro-social behavior. However, the question of how a voting mechanism can be … designed to incentivize ``selfish" individuals to display such behavior remains unresolved. We propose such a mechanism and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012850001
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Separation of powers, political competition and efficient provision of public goods
Boukouras, Aristotelis; Koufopoulos, Kostas - 2011 - This Version: 03 September 2010, First Version: 28 September 2007
In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to become legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining politicians' behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions about the level of the public good. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343846
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Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies with State Dependent Preferences and Feasible Sets
Tian, Guoqiang - 1999
This paper considers Bayesian and Nash implementation in exchange economic environments with state dependent preferences and feasible sets. We fully characterize Bayesian implementability for both diffuse and non-diffuse information structures. We show that, in exchange economic environments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014208048