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Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts

Haake, Claus-Jochen; Klaus, Bettina - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2005

We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005002289

Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts

Haake, Claus-Jochen (contributor); … - 2005

with Contracts ; (Maskin) Monotonicity ; Nash implementation ; Stability …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731666

Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples

Haake, Claus-Jochen; Klaus, Bettina - 2008

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a 'double stable' matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272573

Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples

Haake, Claus-Jochen; Klaus, Bettina - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2008

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005002281

Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples

Haake, Claus-Jochen; Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth - Harvard Business School, Harvard University - 2008

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991811

Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples

Jochen Haake, Claus; Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth - 2008

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215597

Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts

Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth; Walzl, Markus - Harvard Business School, Harvard University - 2007

We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an … substitutable preferences. Apart from obtaining "set inclusion results" on all three domains, we introduce weak setwise stability as … a new stability concept and prove that for substitutable preferences the set of pairwise stable matchings is nonempty …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005754935