We develop an empirical study of the information–persuasion trade-off in advertising using data on the information …

We derive equilibrium incentives to use comparative advertising that pushes up own brand perception and pulls down the … matrices identify diversion ratios, from which we derive comparative advertising damage measures. We find that comparative … advertising causes more damage to the targeted rival than benefit to the advertiser. We simulate banning comparative advertising …

, magazines, newspapers, the Internet, and television (the illustrative example henceforth). Most advertising expenditures are … incurred for these media. They are also mainly supported by advertising revenue. Early work stressed possible market failures … sides are coordinated by broadcasters (or “platforms”) that choose ad levels and program types, and advertising finances the …

This chapter focuses on the economic mechanisms at work in recent models of advertising finance in media markets …, and to clarify the conceptual aspects. The chapter first develops a canonical model of two-sided markets for advertising … advertising markets, and concrete issues such as congestion and second-degree discrimination. The second part is devoted to recent …

We derive equilibrium incentives to use comparative advertising that pushes up own brand perception and pulls down the … matrices identify diversion ratios, from which we derive comparative advertising damage measures. We find that comparative … advertising causes more damage to the targeted rival than benefit to the advertiser. We simulate banning comparative advertising …

We derive equilibrium incentives to use comparative advertising that pushes up own brand perception and pulls down the … matrices identify diversion ratios, from which we derive comparative advertising damage measures. We find that comparative … advertising causes more damage to the targeted rival than benefit to the advertiser. We simulate banning comparative advertising …

We empirically study the information-persuasion trade-off in advertising using data on the information content of …

We extend the persuasion game to bring it squarely into the economics of advertising. We model advertising as exciting … consumer interest into learning more about the product, and determine a firm's equilibrium choice of advertising content over … quality information, price information, and horizontal match information. Equilibrium is unique whenever advertising is …