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Targeted vs. collective information sharing in networks
Kushnir, Alexey; Nichifor, Alexandru - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2014
We introduce a simple two-stage game of endogenous network formation and information sharing for reasoning about the optimal design of social networks like Facebook or Google+. We distinguish between unilateral and bilateral connections and between targeted and collective information sharing....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817258
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Harmful signaling in matching markets
Kushnir, Alexey - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2010
Some labor markets have recently developed formal signaling mechanisms, e.g. the signaling for interviews in the job market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a game of incomplete information between firms and workers....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642479
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On uniqueness and stability of symmetric equilibria in differentiable symmetric games
Hefti, Andreas - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2011
between stability and (in)existence of multiple symmetric equilibria. While there is an equivalence between stability … relationship breaks down in higher dimensions. Stability under symmetric adjustments is a minimum requirement of a symmetric …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643463
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Local contraction-stability and uniqueness
Hefti, Andreas M. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2013
This paper investigates the relationship between uniqueness of Nash equilibria and local stability with respect to the …, local stability and uniqueness are the same formal properties of the game. With equilibrium substitutes, local stability is … equilibria of symmetric games more stable. Finally, the relationship between the stability of the Nash best-response dynamics is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817285
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R&D networks: theory, empirics and policy implications
König, Michael David; Liu, Xiaodong; Zenou, Yves - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2014
We study a structural model of R&D alliance networks in which firms jointly form R&D collaborations to lower their production costs while competing on the product market. We derive the Nash equilibrium of this game, provide a welfare analysis and determine the optimal R&D subsidy program that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010747854
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Testing Theories of Fairness - Intentions Matter
Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
Recently developed models of fairness can explain a wide variety of seemingly contradictory facts. The most controversial and yet unresolved issue in the modeling of fairness preferences concerns the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions. Intuitively, fairness intentions seem to play an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627833
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Moral Property Rights in Bargaining
Gächter, Simon; Riedl, Arno - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in international conflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers seem to hold strong entitlements that shape negotiations. Despite their importance, the role of entitlements in negotiations has not received much attention. We fill the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627849
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The Relevance of Procedural Utility for Economics
Benz, Matthias - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2005
This paper aims at showing the relevance of procedural utility for economics: people do not only care about outcomes, as usually assumed in economics, they also value the processes and conditions leading to outcomes. The psychological foundations of procedural utility are outlined and it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627921
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Unique Equilibria in the Rubinstein Bargaining Model when the Payoff Set is Non-Convex
Koehler, Wolfgang F. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2005
I give necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a wide class of Rubinstein bargaining models. The requirements encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. The equilibrium of the non-cooperative game is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627955
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On the Nature of Fair Behavior
Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
This paper shows that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. This result casts doubt on the consequentialist practice in economics to define the utility of an action solely in terms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627957