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Ein funktionstüchtiges System privater Arbeitslosenversicherung
Glismann, Hans H.; Schrader, Klaus - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001606989
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Optionen einer effizienten Gestaltung der Arbeitslosenversicherung
Glismann, Hans H.; Schrader, Klaus - 2001
Versicherungsmodell heraus. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit wird daher auf die besonders in Deutschland vorherrschenden Zweifel an der …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011477212
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Should UI benefits really fall over time?
Hassler, John; Rodríguez Mora, José Vicente - 2002
The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in a tractable model allowing moral hazard, adverse selection and hidden saving. Analytical results show that when the search productivity of unemployed is constant over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414504
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Should UI benefits really fall over time?
Hassler, John; Rodríguez Mora, José Vicente - 2002
The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in an analytically tractable model allowing moral hazard, adverse selection and hidden savings. Analytical results show that when the search productivity of unemployed is constant over...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011513998
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414725
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Ein Instrument zur Eindämmung von Moral Hazard in der Arbeitslosenversicherung ist die finanzielle Sanktion in Form … Vermittlungsvorschlägen und Sperrzeiten auf die Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit und die Qualität der aufgenommenen Jobs.Wir schätzen Multi … auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Krankmeldung. Dieser Effekt ist geringer in späteren Monaten der Arbeitslosigkeit. Dies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418245
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449662
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2017
of male job seekers in West Germany in the year 2000, we analyze the effects of vacancy referrals and sanctions on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011635521
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An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - 2002 - First draft: April 2002, This version: December 2002
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010519045
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Active unemployment insurance
Røed, Knut - 2012
– to minimize the conflict between income insurance and work incentives and to prevent the economic crisis from causing a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009546532