I study the history and performance of commercial real estate (CRE) in the pension fund portfolio, showing how many plan sponsors fundamentally changed their approach to CRE investment once underfunding gaps began to emerge in the early and middle 2000s. Several new empirical facts are...

In recent years, U.S. government entities have become increasingly active as commercial participants in corporate restructurings by providing rescue loans when private market funding is unavailable. Like private lenders, the government can effectively control the operations of distressed...

The present work deals with the fiscal decentralization reforms in developing countries. Empirical evidence demonstrates that deficiencies in the decentralization process, particularly on revenue composition issues, are many even today and of difficult solution for developing countries. Our...

An appropriately conceived and well-designed border climate adjustment scheme, as a policy mechanism potentially utilizable by many States party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, may lead to desirable consequences for the development of comprehensive global greenhouse...

This paper investigates how corrupt public officials and private agents adjust to policy reforms that change opportunities for bribery deals to take place. I exploit an exogenously determined tariff liberalization program that altered opportunities to extract bribes through a particular method...

A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness, we derive a bidding mechanism determining endogenously who participates in...

This paper investigates how corrupt public officials and firms adjust to policy reforms that change opportunities for bribery deals to take place. I take advantage of an exogenously determined tariff liberalization program that altered opportunities to extract bribes through a particular method...

A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness (Güth and Kliemt, 2013), we derive a bidding mechanism determining...

We set up a signaling game where individuals differ in ability and wealth. Higher ability means larger benefit supported by the government. Costly signals are used to transmit information regarding own deservingness. However, capital market imperfections may perturb the signals by limiting the...