Studies of the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) assumed a benevolent government who maximizes social welfare. The aim of our paper is to develop a theoretical framework in which the Government’s decisions are influenced by green and producer lobbies. To this end, we...

International environmental agreements (IEAs) are increasingly important in a globalized economy. The aim of our paper is study the effect of political pressure groups-lobbies on the size and stability of IEAs. To this purpose we use the framework of two-level games to explain how national...

This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the...

We examine numerous settings in which large strategic nations make environmental policies in the presence of international trade and form coalitions that aim to mitigate global or continental transnational pollution. We show that every nation has incentives to internalize all emission...

This paper presents a model of international environmental agreements in which cooperation between asymmetric countries can arise through pure self-interest. It demonstrates how emissions trading creates economic surplus by exploiting asymmetries. This surplus can be distributed via the...

The Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) links a variety of existing and future observation systems and forecasting models into one comprehensive system of systems to provide accurate environmental data and to enable an encompassing vision and understanding of the Earth system....

This paper examines the efficiency of decentralized leadership where regional governments contribute to the provision of multiple regional and national public goods. Unlimited decentralized leadership is inefficient because regional governments have incentives to overspend resources in the...

The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful...

In this paper we present a model of international environmental agreements in the presence of threshold effects. The model is in the tradition of models of international environmental agreements formulated as games in partition function form. Games in partition function form allow the...

The theory of international environmental agreements overwhelmingly assumes that governments engage as unitary agents. Each government makes choices based on benefits and costs that are simple national aggregates, and similarly on a single set of national-level motivations, together drawing a...