Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970) proposed that organizations persist when loyalty tempers incentives to exit after adverse shocks. We test this argument using newly digitized individual-level voting records from 28 English constituencies (1832-1868), covering 134,000 real votes....

To what extent did class shape political behavior during early democratization and industrialization, and did class voting reflect economic interests or durable political identities? We use newly collected individual-level panel data from open-ballot elections in the nineteenth-century...

This study examines the dynamics of economic freedom in nine advanced democracies in comparison to China over the 1970-2022 period. Using data from the Fraser Institute and the Manifesto Project Database, we apply a Bayesian time-series methodology to identify three key patterns. First, economic...

We study the communication strategies on Twitter/X of 367 political leaders in 21 countries, focusing on electoral competition between populists and non-populists. We measure polarization by the ease with which the leader can be classified as populist or not, conditional on his tweet. We find...

We study how politicians respond to the fact-checking of their public statements. Our research design employs a difference-in-differences approach, complemented by a randomized field intervention conducted in collaboration with a leading fact-checking organization. We find that fact-checking...

This study critically examines HYBRIT, a Swedish flagship project led by state-owned LKAB to produce fossil-free sponge iron using hydrogen from fossil-free electricity. Framed as central to EU's green transition, HYBRIT promised CO₂ cuts exceeding Sweden's total emissions but faced major...

We develop a model of monetary policy committee decision-making, building on the framework of games played through agents (GPTA). Interest groups seek to influence policy by offering action-contingent contracts to committee members. The resulting equilibrium admits a simple characterization and...

In a strategy-proof mechanism, implementation theory mostly assumes that each agent is rational in the sense that the agent reveals its true preference to induce its most preferred outcome. This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that the agent seeks such an outcome, but not necessary because...

Environmental challenges increasingly shape political discourses across Europe, yet their influence on actual environmental governance remains unclear. This paper examines the political economy mechanisms linking environmental change, party platforms, and the decentralisation of environmental...

This paper models theoretically and tests empirically the hypothesis that the decision about the location of a public bad within a multi-tiered structure of government (a facility providing benefits throughout the federation but inflicting damage to the region hosting it) can be driven by...

International environmental agreements (IEAs) often condition entry into force on ratification by a minimum number of countries, yet deep environmental commitments frequently face strong domestic political resistance. We study how IEA breadth, through minimum ratification thresholds (MRTs), and...

Why are inefficient policies popular? One explanation is incomplete voter information. Evidence from survey experiments in Argentina points instead to inattention. The experiments explore voter evaluations of two anti-inflation policies, price controls and limits on monetary emission....

We provide a rationale for Co-Voting, a decision-making procedure that blends elements of direct and representative democracy to mitigate their main inefficiencies. A randomly selected group of citizens receives voting rights on specific issues, with their collective decision aggregated with...

We describe Aristotle's mathematical model of weighted voting to explain and implement decision-making in democracies, oligarchies and the mixed states that combine elements of both systems. This model, originally presented in textual form, extends the known history of social choice theory back...

The transition to neighborhood-scale district heating in the Netherlands frequently stalls due to the challenge of achieving a collective agreement among individual homeowners. To explore the micro-dynamics of this collective action problem, this paper introduces an agent-based model that...

This paper argues that Colombia's taxation problems reflect a deeper political economy equilibrium shaped by extractive institutions, extreme inequality, and cultural norms that favor individual solutions over collective ones. Historical legacies produced a weak and often distrusted state, which...

This paper studies how gender representation affects collective decision-making in expert committees. I exploit quasi-random assignment of judges to panels in the Greek Supreme Court using newly digitized data on 3,700 criminal appeals. I find that panels with more female judges are more likely...

We study how Americans trade off the welfare of the poor versus the rich using incentivized transfer experiments. Combining this with estimates of the Elasticity of Taxable Income, we quantify optimal income tax rates in the US. Revealed preferences show strong concern for the poor across the...

A growing literature concerns the role of symbolic politics, including how political parties benefit electorally from politicizing the past, a strategy which should be more effective in localities with physical memories of the past. We test this argument by studying the effect of the local...

Green Deals have been introduced across Western economies as large-scale, mission-oriented innovation policies (MOIPs) intended to combine economic growth with environmental sustainability. Rooted in the concept of an "entrepreneurial state," these initiatives reflect renewed confidence in...

This open access book analyses whether and to what extent fiscal transfers from central to local governments affect democracy at sub-national level. Fiscal transfers are often perceived to undermine democracy, as politicians utilise them to build patronage networks, weaken opposition candidates,...

Using a novel dataset in a difference-in-differences framework, I study the political implications of the change in policies protecting drought-impacted communities in Tunisia in 3088 districts. In 2016, the Tunisian government had drastically reduced support to farmers affected by droughts. I...

The concept of the Condorcet winner has become central to most electoral models in the political economy literature. A Condorcet winner is the alternative preferred by a plurality in every pairwise competition; the notion of a k-winner generalizes that of a Condorcet winner. The k-winner is the...

The publication of nearly 600,000 new species occurrence maps using Global Biodiversity Information Facility data provides an opportunity to reassess international species protection with broader representation for plants, invertebrates, and other species. This development aligns with the global...

An extension rule assigns to each fractional tournament x (specifying, for every pair of social alternatives a and b, the proportion xab of voters who prefer a to b) a random choice function y (specifying a collective choice probability distribution for each subset of alternatives), which...