Werden Bundestagsabgeordnete von ihren Parteien abgestraft, wenn sie in namentlichen Abstimmungen im Bundestag nicht mit ihrer Partei stimmen? Betrachtet wurden alle 218 namentlichen Abstimmungen in der Legislaturperiode 2009–2013 für 257 über die Liste in den Bundestag eingezogene...

We examine whether parties punish politicians who vote against the party line in roll-call votes. Using data of German members of parliament over the legislative period 2009-2013, we take into account that the effect of punishment differs along the list of candidates because a candidate is...

An important question in representative democracies is how to ensure that politicians behave in the best interest of citizens rather than their own private interests. Aside from elections, one of the few institutional devices available to regulate the actions of politicians is their pay...

This paper uses data on bill sponsorship and cosponsorship in the U.S. House of Representatives to estimate gender differences in cooperative behavior. We employ a number of econometric methodologies to address the potential selection of female representatives into electoral districts with...

This thesis comprises four empirical research papers in the area of political economics. While the first two chapters deal with questions related to direct democracy, chapters three and four are about topics linked to representative democracy.

The Brexit referendum and the decision of British voters to leave the EU have sparked a comprehensive debate on the future of European integration. A key issue in this debate is the appropriate division of responsibilities between the EU and its Member States. The EU might still lack certain...

Diese Dissertation setzt sich mit dem Informationsverhalten von Parlamentarierinnen und Parlamentariern auseinander. Sie untersucht im Besonderen die Rolle von Performance Informationen für Budgetentscheidungen. Die Dissertation besteht aus einer Einleitung, drei Artikeln und einem Schlussteil....

We examine whether parties punish politicians who vote against the party line in roll-call votes. Using data of German members of parliament (MPs) over the legislative period 2009–2013, we take into account that the effect of punishment differs along the list of candidates because a candidate...

Die Bürgerinnen und die Bürger können im Staat nicht alles selbst entscheiden. Sie brauchen Repräsentanten. Charles B. Blankart, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin und Universität Luzern, und Dennis C. Mueller, Universität Wien, stellen in ihrem Kommentar fünf Regierungsmodelle vor und...

Eine neue Studie untersucht, ob Nebeneinkünfte die politische Tätigkeit von Bundestagsabgeordneten beeinträchtigen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen nicht, dass Nebeneinkünfte mit der Abwesenheit in namentlichen Abstimmungen und der Zahl der Reden im Parlament korrelieren. Es gibt jedoch eine negative...

Eine neue Studie untersucht, ob Nebeneinkünfte die politische Tätigkeit von Bundestagsabgeordneten beeinträchtigen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen nicht, dass Nebeneinkünfte mit der Abwesenheit in namentlichen Abstimmungen und der Zahl der Reden im Parlament korrelieren. Es gibt jedoch eine negative...

Die Bürgerinnen und die Bürger können im Staat nicht alles selbst entscheiden. Sie brauchen Repräsentanten. Charles B. Blankart, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin und Universität Luzern, und Dennis C. Mueller, Universität Wien, stellen in ihrem Kommentar fünf Regierungsmodelle vor und...

We study the harmonization of the base remuneration for the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who were previously paid like national parliamentarians implying large differences between the delegations from the 27 member countries. Based on detailed information on individual MEPs between...

Attorneys elected to the US House of Representatives and to US state legislatures are systematically less likely to vote in favor of tort reforms that restrict tort litigation, but more likely to support bills that extend tort law. This finding is based on the analysis of 54 votes at the federal...

We study the harmonization of the base remuneration for the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who were previously paid like national parliamentarians implying large differences between the delegations from the 27 member countries. Based on detailed information on individual MEPs between...

Attorneys elected to the US House of Representatives and to US state legislatures are systematically less likely to vote in favor of tort reforms that restrict tort litigation, but more likely to support bills that extend tort law. This finding is based on the analysis of 54 votes at the federal...

The paper seeks to answer whether career politicians differ systematically from the general population in terms of their attitudes toward risk. A written survey of members of the 17th German Bundestag in late 2011 identified their risk attitudes, and the survey data was set in relation to...

Members of parliament in many countries are legally permitted to execute (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate. It is often argued that such moonlighting activities are unproblematic for the chain of democratic delegation and accountability as long as outside interests/earnings...

Members of parliament in many countries are legally permitted to execute (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate. It is often argued that such "moonlighting" activities are unproblematic for the chain of democratic delegation and accountability as long as outside interests/earnings...

Prior to July 2009, salaries of the members of the European Parliament were paid by their home country and there were substantial salary differences between parliamentarians representing different EU countries. Starting in July 2009, the salary of each member of the Parliament is pegged to 38.5%...

Prior to July 2009, salaries of the members of the European Parliament were paid by their home country and there were substantial salary differences between parliamentarians representing different EU countries. Starting in July 2009, the salary of each member of the Parliament is pegged to 38.5%...

Prior to July 2009, salaries of the members of the European Parliament were paid by their home country and there were substantial salary differences between parliamentarians representing different EU countries. Starting in July 2009, the salary of each member of the Parliament is pegged to 38.5%...

Do incumbents in an election have an advantage, and if so, are these advantages heterogeneous across parties or government and opposition? We first present a theoretical discussion on the possible heterogeneity of incumbency effects in a pure two-party system. Then, we estimate the incumbency...

Prior to July 2009, salaries of the members of the European Parliament were paid by their home country and there were substantial salary differences between parliamentarians representing different EU countries. Starting in July 2009, the salary of each member of the Parliament is pegged to 38.5%...