We study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance problem under adverse selection (see Stiglitz [1977]) where we allow for a random distribution of losses, possibly correlated with the agent's risk parameter that is private information. Our model explains patterns of observed...

I consider a neoclassical growth model with endogenous labor supply in which agents have private information about their idiosyncratic value of leisure. A key assumption is that these shocks follow a persistent stochastic process over time. For this economy I solve the economy-wide mechanism...

Why do households use different types of loans? Which factors cause borrowers to default? Using a comprehensive survey dataset from Chile, I estimate a partial information model of consumer debt access, lender choice, loan amount and default. The model consists of a first-stage multinomial logit...

Despite widespread use in online transactions, rating systems only provide summary statistics of buyers' diverse opinions at best. To investigate the consequences of this coarse form of information aggregation, we consider a dynamic lemons market in which buyers share their evaluations...

A feature of many insurance markets is that they combine vertical differentiation (all consumers prefer high to low-coverage policies) and adverse selection (high cost customers prefer high-coverage plans). Building on Novshek and Sonnenschein (1978) and Azevedo and Gottlieb (2017), this paper...

The objective of this paper is to pursue an intuitive idea: For a consumer who is an unfavorable health risk but a “better risk” regarding a second peril, would a multi-peril policy not be associated with a reduced selection effort on the part of the insurer? If this intuition should be...

The trade-off between increased representation and perceived quality is central to the debate on how to address underrepresentation in high-profile professions. We address this trade-off using a dynamic model of career selection where juniors value both the identity and perceived quality of...

The literature has shown that the overall efficiency of exogenously imposed tournaments is reduced by a high variance in performance. This paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self-select into different payment schemes is reducing the variability of...

Certifications are an important signaling device for attenuating information asymmetry. This study examines their role on a Chinese online marketplace lending platform, which grants certifications to borrowers after they submit the necessary documents. Although the platform verifies the...

This paper builds a directed search model with asymmetric information and argues that small firms hold liquid assets not only to self-finance investment but also to show their investment quality to obtain better loan terms. Because self-finance is an outside option of borrowing, it affects bank...

Most of the previous research in the asymmetric information problem treats adverse selection and moral hazard separately, though they may coexist and interact with each other. We build a principal-agent model to examine optimal contracts in a competitive insurance market facing adverse selection...

We show the anticipation of a bailout of distressed firms worsens ex ante adverse selection, causing a market freeze and inviting government intervention - a "bailout trap." When firms of heterogenous qualities raise financing, high-quality firms are willing to bear adverse selection costs...

We develop a tractable model of systemic bank runs. The market-based banking system features a two-layer structure: banks with heterogeneous fundamentals face potential runs by their creditors while they trade short-term funding in the asset (interbank) market in response to creditor...

I study a model of blockholder short-termism, where each blockholder (e.g., activist shareholder) has a stake in a different firm and can sell before the impact of his actions on firm value is realized. I find that the existence of value-destroying blockholders can increase average firm value,...

Exploiting a unique setting of overlapping insiders between acquirers and targets in India, we examine how information asymmetry between the transacting parties influences the returns to acquiring firms’ shareholders as well as the method of payment. Using a novel dataset, we find that...

We study the welfare effects of offering choice over coverage levels—“vertical choice”—in regulated health insurance markets. We emphasize that heterogeneity in the efficient level of coverage is not sufficient to motivate choice. When premiums do not reflect individuals' costs, it may...

This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients' severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the...

This study examines the relationship between securitization and loan performance using proprietary loan-level data from a Chinese bank. Securitized loans exhibit lower ex-post default rates and prepayment chances compared to the loans retained on the bank's balance sheet, suggesting no adverse...

A designer relies on a costly screening device to allocate a set of goods, aiming to maximize a social welfare function. We provide conditions for one screening device to dominate another. We show that the performance of a screening device depends on two channels: (i) targeting effectiveness...

Technological advances in the insurance industry mean that insurers now may be better informed about underlying risks faced by individual consumers than consumers themselves. We evaluate the impact of these information frictions on welfare by combining demand elicitation surveys with insurance...

We study the effects of a country’s propensity to renegotiate transportation infrastructure contracts on the technical efficiency of the firms they attract. Firms are characterized by their ability to lobby and by their technical efficiency. In equilibrium, countries with a higher propensity...

E-commerce is a typical form of retail digitalization that introduces online uncertainty and product returns. To decrease the negative influence of online uncertainty, the largest Chinese e-commerce company, the Alibaba Group, invited an insurance company to develop return-freight insurance...

Based on digital technology, the Internet credit loan (ICL) quickly expands in China with pricing advantages and inclusiveness. However, we find a significant adverse selection problem in China’s ICL market. Using the 2019 China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) data, households with higher...

This paper studies bank competition with borrower adverse selection. In the model, expected non-performing loan costs are high when credit is granted in booms, when risk free rates are low, or when competition is strong. I prove that full competition is suboptimal due to this last effect; that...

We study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance problem under adverse selection (see Stiglitz [1977]) where we allow for a random distribution of losses, possibly correlated with the agent’s risk parameter that is private information. Our model explains patterns of observed...

We build a model of endogenous credit cycles arising from the dynamics of adverse selection. Heterogeneous entrepreneurs trade productive assets in an anonymous market subject to financial frictions. Cream-skimming rent-seekers create lemon assets that can be traded. Lemon assets are...

This paper studies how information frictions in the securitization market amplify the response of mortgage credit supply to house price shocks. We model securitization as an optimal contracting problem between investors and banks. Banks are better informed than investors about the quality of the...

A model of over-the-counter markets is proposed. Some asset buyers are informed in that they can identify high-quality assets. Heterogeneous sellers with private information choose what type of buyers they want to trade with. When the measure of informed buyers is low, there exists a unique...

In a continuous-time setting, we study the design of a dynamic contract between a government and a private entity, wherein the latter commits to pay the government in return for the exclusive right to sell a service by operating a public facility. Private revenues are modelled as depending on...

Seit 2006 ist es bei der Kalkulation von Riester-Verträgen nicht mehr gestattet, das Geschlecht als Faktor in der Risikobewertung heranzuziehen. Das könnte dazu geführt haben, dass Verträge für Männer, die im Durchschnitt eine kürzere Lebenserwartung haben als Frauen, nach der Reform...