We implement a repeated version of the Barro-Gordon monetary policy game in the laboratory and ask whether reputation serves as a substitute for commitment, enabling the central bank to achieve the efficient Ramsey equilibrium and avoid the inefficient, time-inconsistent one-shot Nash...

We analyze the costs and benefits of using social image to foster virtuous behavior. A Principal seeks to motivate reputation-conscious agents to supply a public good. Each agent chooses how much to contribute based on his own mix of public-spiritedness, private signal about the value of the...

This paper analyzes a mechanism through which a supplier of unknown quality can overcome its asymmetric information problem by selling via a reputable downstream rm. The supplier’s adverse-selection problem can be solved if the downstream rm has established a reputation for delivering high...

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a...

Recent research has highlighted social image and identity concerns as factors that influence economic decisions. Given that an individual’s choice of employment may be important for their social image, we consider a model of worker sorting into the mission-oriented or private sector with...

Recent empirical studies suggest that poor public sector performance in developing nations is due in part to the difficultly of selecting workers whose motivation is aligned with the mission of the institution -- in direct contrast to evidence from developed nations, public sector workers tend...

We study reputational herding in financial markets in a laboratory experiment. In the spirit of Dasgupta and Prat (2008), career concerns are introduced in a sequential asset market, where wages for investors are set by subjects in the role of employers. Employers can observe investment...

We experimentally examine the effects of price competition in markets for expe-rience goods where sellers can build up reputations for quality. We compare price competition to monopolistic markets and markets where prices are exogenously fixed (somewhere between the endogenous oligopoly and...

Classical economic theory assumes that people are rational and selfish, but behavioral experiments often point to inconsistent behavior, typically attributed to "other regarding preferences." The Ultimatum Game, used to study fairness, and the Trust Game, used to study trust and trustworthiness,...

Using Google search activity data can help detect, in real time and at high frequency, a wide spectrum of breaking socio-economic trends around the world. This wealth of data is the result of an ongoing and ever more pervasive digitization of information. Search activity data stand in contrast...

Die Unternehmensreputation hat sich im Zeitalter der Globalisierung und Digitalisierung zu einem der wichtigsten Erfolgsfaktoren entwickelt. Die Wissenschaft begleitet diese Entwicklung durch intensive theoretische und empirische Forschungsarbeiten. Trotz unzureichender Datensätze besteht...

Ungeachtet der Zunahme von normativen und empirischen Studien im Bereich Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), sind die Treiber glaubwürdiger CSR-Berichterstattung immer noch unklar. Viele Studien verweisen darauf, dass die Integration von CSR in die Unternehmensstrategie es Firmen...

"It's generally accepted that being in a bigger market or on a winning team can cause a player to be overrated, while the opposite can leave them underrated. This book studies the effects of the sports media spotlight (and its absence) on the fortunes of teams in pennant races and Hall of Fame...

We develop and estimate a general equilibrium model in which monetary policy can deviate from active in.ation stabilization and agents face uncertainty about the nature of these deviations. When observing a deviation, agents conduct Bayesian learning to infer its likely duration. Under...

Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

We show that political booms, measured by the rise in governments' popularity, predict financial crises above and beyond other better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging...