This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on a continuous Japanese-English auction in a common-value 'wallet game'. The main objective is to test whether bidders follow the equilibrium bidding strategy predicted by theory. We find systematic deviations from equilibrium behaviour:...

The Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) promotes non-price criteria in renewable auctions. It aims to unlock green willingness-to-pay and scale up manufacturing capacity for net-zero technologies in the European Union (EU). This paper builds a partial equilibrium model of the European solar module...

Hirshleifer's difference-form contest technology is a useful tool in the study of a class of conflict, especially military combats. We aim to highlight an important feature that the Hirshleifer contest model distinctively has, namely passivity (bidding zero effort) may stand as an effective...

In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense, or maximise the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple divisible goods. Competitive equilibrium outcomes, and only those, are constrained utilitarian efficient, a...

Public procurement is highly susceptible to corruption, especially in developing countries. Although open auctions are widely adopted to curb it, this paper finds that corruption remains prevalent even within this procurement format. Procurement officers can collaborate with firms to manipulate...

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on a continuous Japanese-English auction in a common-value "wallet game". The main objective is to test whether bidders follow the equilibrium bidding strategy predicted by theory. We find systematic deviations from equilibrium behaviour:...

Priority-based allocation often requires eliminating justified envy, making serial dictatorship (SD) the only non-wasteful direct mechanism with that property. However, SD's outcomes can conflict with the policymaker's objectives. We introduce visible fairness, a framework where fairness is...

We characterize Nash equilibria in multi-product markets in which producers commit to vectors of supply functions contingent on all prices. The framework accommodates (dis)economies of scope in production, and goods may be substitutes or complements in demand. We show that equilibrium...

We consider a package assignment problem with money, in which a set M of objects is allocated to agents. Each agent has preferences that are not necessarily quasi-linear. The admissible set of object allocations is chosen by the planner to pursue specific objectives in conjunction with the rule....

We analyze vertical integration in auction markets using a symmetric independent private-values model where the auctioneer invests in the auctioned object's quality. We find that the auctioneer invests more after integration. The integrated bidder enjoys a bidding advantage over other bidders....

In response to rising global government debt, sovereign debt management offices (DMOs) are increasingly refining their issuance methods to optimize investor engagement and minimize borrowing costs. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of a two-stage Treasury auction design that incorporates a...

This report supports the European Commission (DG ENER) in the design and implementation of a European import auction for renewable hydrogen and its derivatives under the European Hydrogen Bank (EHB). The EHB aims to contribute to the EU's climate neutrality goal by 2050. While domestic auctions...

We develop a method for detecting cartels in multistage auctions. Our approach allows a firm to be collusive when facing members of its cartel yet competitive when facing others. Intuitively, as initial bids are shaded, close initial bids not only imply similar costs but also provide an...

By combining vegetable and fish production in a closed-loop system, aquaponics is a promising technology to contribute to sustainable food production. However, information about consumer preferences for aquaponic products is limited and most studies measure willingness to pay hypothetically. The...

We investigate profit-share auctions in a procurement context,comparing them with traditional cash auctions to identify which mechanism yields lower expenses for buyers. We also explore whether specifying a high project value in profit-share auction contracts influences supplier bidding...

We investigate how buyer-supplier communication affects procurement prices, comparing auctions without direct communication to negotiations allowing it. In controlled experiments involving students and procurement professionals, we find communication increases prices, disadvantaging buyers....

Sellers face a critical choice: run competitive auctions or strike exclusive deals with preferred buyers. Contrary to conventional wisdom that sellers should rely on open competition, we show that a powerful seller optimally commits to a sequential `flexclusivity' arrangement - a strategic mix...

This paper examines the welfare implications of priority service in a frictional search environment with heterogeneous outside options. Priority search facilitates expedited matching with public options in the market by charging a service premium. Our main analysis demonstrates that a...