Purpose - This paper investigates whether disclosure quality and a history of overpaying for acquisitions are associated with differences in the value-relevance of gains on bargain purchase with high disclosure prominence. Design/methodology/approach - Findings are from multivariate regression...

We use novel surveys of firms and workers, linked to administrative employer-employee data, to study the prevalence and importance of individual bargaining in wage determination. We show that simple survey questions accurately elicit firms' bargaining strategies. Using the elicited strategies...

We conduct an artefactual field experiment in real-existing trade networks to analyze how individual network degree affects bargaining demands and outcomes. We combine data from a bilateral bargaining experiment with data of trade networks in 24 villages in Uganda. To identify the effect of...

The remarkable increase in the use of economic sanctions as a coercive tool of foreign policy over the past quarter century has been accompanied by an equally rapid growth in the number of academic and policy studies, which most often aim at quantifying the economic effects of sanctions and/or...

Public procurement contracts require frequent renegotiation. We exploit the Czech implementation of an EU policy as a natural experiment to investigate the effect of eased renegotiation rules. We document that the eased renegotiation rules decreased winning bids but did not change the final...

The remarkable increase in the use of economic sanctions as a coercive tool of foreign policy over the past quarter century has been accompanied by an equally rapid growth in the number of academic and policy studies, which most often aim at quantifying the economic effects of sanctions and/or...

We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a...

I study a central authority's ability to commit to a publicly announced mechanism in a one-to-one agent-object matching model. The authority announces a strategy-proof mechanism and then privately selects a mechanism to initiate a matching. An agent's observation in form of the final matching...

We revisit the classical object reallocation problem under strict preferences. When attention is constrained to the set of Pareto-efficient rules, it is known that top trading cycles (TTC) is the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. We relax this constraint and consider...

This paper studies bargaining outcomes in economies in which agents may be able to impose outcomes that deviate from the relevant social norms but incur costs when they do so. It characterizes bargaining outcomes that are easiest for a society to sustain as part of a social norm that everybody...

This paper theoretically investigates the strategic implications of varying reliability of bargaining partners under unanimous and non-unanimous voting. Three players (one proposer, two responders) bargain over the distribution of a pie. One responder has private information about his valuation...

Since the advent of Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) models, countercyclical unemployment risk has been deemed an important amplification mechanism for business cycles shocks. Yet, the aggregate effects of such "unemployment fears" are hard to pin down. We thus revisit this issue in the...

This volume offers in-depth analyses of micro-instances of revenue bargaining across five African countries. The case studies all draw on a common theoretical framework combining the fiscal contract theory with the political settlement approach, which enables a systematic exploration into what...

We investigate experimentally how the menstrual cycle affects bargaining behavior and bargaining outcomes of women. Female participants negotiate in an unstructured bilateral bargaining game with asymmetric information about the allocation of a surplus ('pie size'). We find that the menstrual...

The Global Malmquist Productivity Index (GMPI) stands as an evolution of the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI), emphasizing global technology to incorporate all-time versions of Decision-Making Units (DMUs). This paper introduces a novel approach, integrating the Nash Bargaining Game model with...

Despite recent advances, no general methods for computing bargaining power in non-cooperative games exist. We propose a number of axioms such a measure should satisfy and show that they characterise a unique function. The principle underlying this measure is that the influence of a player can be...

We examine democratic public-good provision with heterogeneous legislators. Decisions are taken by majority rule and an agenda-setter proposes a level of the public good, taxes, and subsidies. Members are heterogeneous with respect to their benefits from the public good. We find that, depending...

This paper studies bargaining between a seller and a buyer with binary private valuation. Because the setting is more tractable than the case of general valuation distributions (studied in Gul et al., 1986), we are able to explicitly construct the full set of equilibria via induction. This lets...

We investigate experimentally how the menstrual cycle affects bargaining behavior and bargaining outcomes of women. Female participants negotiate in an unstructured bilateral bargaining game with asymmetric information about the allocation of a surplus ('pie size'). We find that the menstrual...