In many professional activities humans are getting better generation by generation. This is supposed to be the case, for instance, in sports and in science. Is it true in the arts? In this paper, we consider violinists from the time period in which audio and video recordings became possible....

We conduct an artefactual field experiment in real-existing trade networks to analyze how individual network degree affects bargaining demands and outcomes. We combine data from a bilateral bargaining experiment with data of trade networks in 24 villages in Uganda. To identify the effect of...

We use novel surveys of firms and workers, linked to administrative employer-employee data, to study the prevalence and importance of individual bargaining in wage determination. We show that simple survey questions accurately elicit firms' bargaining strategies. Using the elicited strategies...

We develop a model that incorporates task-based production into a matching model with intrafirm wage bargaining. Unlike in existing task-based models, the representative firm derives the optimal task allocation as a function of capital and labor, rather than relative factor prices. Embedding...

We propose a standard search and bargaining model with divisible money, in which only the random matching market opens and the generalized Nash bargaining settles each trade. Assuming fixed production costs, we analytically characterize a tractable equilibrium, called a pay‐all equilibrium ,...

The decentralization of wage-setting - from multi-employer bargaining to firm-level agreements - allows firms to adjust their internal wage structure but has uncertain effects on inequality. This article estimates the difference in within-firm wage inequality between centralized and firm-level...

This article bridges monopoly, monopsony, and countervailing power theories to analyze their welfare implications in a vertical supply chain. We develop a bilateral monopoly model with bargaining that accommodates upstream monopsony and downstream monopoly power. In equilibrium, the...

Purpose - This paper investigates whether disclosure quality and a history of overpaying for acquisitions are associated with differences in the value-relevance of gains on bargain purchase with high disclosure prominence. Design/methodology/approach - Findings are from multivariate regression...

Conveying private information to interested parties is central to almost every economic and social activity. In such interactions, the sender may lie by misreporting the truth, but may also deceive by inducing inaccurate beliefs about the payoff-relevant state. While a huge experimental...

Establishing a partnership necessitates agreeing on how to divide future profits or losses. We consider parties who wish to contract on the division of uncertain future profits. We propose to divide profits according to the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky (K-S) solution, which is the intersection point...

This article explores the impact of procedural information on the behavior of students under two school admission procedures commonly used in the US, the EU, and other jurisdictions: the Gale-Shapley mechanism and the Boston mechanism. In a lab experiment, I compare the impact of information...

This paper shows that bargaining over tax payments is an important feature of tax compliance and enforcement in lower income countries. Analyzing the universe of administrative tax filings from Zambia, we document sharp bunching in (i) dominated regions above tax schedule discontinuities,...

A war consists of multiple battles, yet the theoretical literature of International Relations has given little attention to how battles relate within a war. By integrating two ultimatum games with private information played by an Aggressor and a Defender, we develop bargaining models of war with...

Schelling (1956) first clarified how power to reduce one’s freedom of choice might benefit a bargaining party. A commitment to reject proposals, when successful, may force concessions from opponents who otherwise might have an upper hand. This paper experimentally studies credible commitments...

I consider an underexplored possible explainer of the "surprising" results of Ultimatum Game experiments, namely, that Proposers and Recipients consider following only some of all the logically possible strategies of their Ultimatum Game. I present an evolutionary analysis of different games...