We develop a model to discuss a government's incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The industry consists of a polluting firm with private information about its production technology. Implementing a transfer-based regulation policy requires the government to make...

Which incentives have the strongest impact on the size of the shadow economy? Is it about government's pressure against entrepreneurs operating in this sector, or is it about the benefits of legality? The goal of this paper is to explicitly contrast the role of sticks (court repressiveness) and...

This paper studies the wasteful effect of bureaucracy on the economy by addressing the link between opportunistic behavior of government bureaucrats and the public sector wage bill. In particular, public officials are modeled as individuals competing for a larger share of those public funds. A...

This paper examines the determinants of sector-specific regulation imposed on broadband markets related both to efficiency objectives of regulators and to those of narrowly defined interest groups. We test hypotheses derived from the normative and positive theoretical literature employing recent...

We investigate whether and how economic integration increases state capacity. This important relationship has not been studied in detail so far. We put together a conceptual framework to guide our analysis that highlights what we call the Montesquieu, Weber and Smith channels. Each of these...

This paper examines the determinants of sector-specific regulation imposed on broadband markets related both to efficiency objectives of regulators and to those of narrowly defined interest groups. We test hypotheses derived from the normative and positive theoretical literature employing recent...

We investigate whether and how economic integration increases state capacity. This important relationship has not been studied in detail so far. We put together a conceptual framework to guide our analysis that highlights what we call the Montesquieu, Weber and Smith channels. Each of these...

Why is it that HR specialists appear to have difficulty applying their knowledge, systems and techniques in a systematic way when it comes to professional services firms (PSFs) - particularly when the drivers for developing powerful HRM practices within such businesses seem more pressing than...

The paper is an exploratory historical analysis, based on documentary research and literature review, which focuses on the formation of the bureaucratic apparatus in the area of economic infrastructure, analyzed from the perspective of the construction of the Brazilian State and its technical,...

Which incentives have the strongest impact on the size of the shadow economy? Is it about government's pressure against entrepreneurs operating in this sector, or is it about the benefits of legality? The goal of this paper is to explicitly contrast the role of sticks (court repressiveness) and...

We develop a model to discuss a government’s incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The industry consists of a polluting firm with private information about its production technology. Implementing a transfer-based regulation policy requires the government to make...

This paper analyzes the conflicts of interest arising from the "revolving door". The revolving door is a common phenomenon, and it is unlikely that most of it can be explained by "regulatory capture", a practice that is unlawful. Therefore, there is a need for a new framework. This paper...

The paper is an exploratory historical analysis, based on documentary research and literature review, which focuses on the formation of the bureaucratic apparatus in the area of economic infrastructure, analyzed from the perspective of the construction of the Brazilian State and its technical,...

This paper analyzes the conflicts of interest arising from the "revolving door". The revolving door is a common phenomenon, and it is unlikely that most of it can be explained by "regulatory capture", a practice that is unlawful. Therefore, there is a need for a new framework. This paper...

We develop a model to discuss a government's incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The industry consists of a polluting firm with private information about its production technology. Implementing a transfer-based regulation policy requires the government to make...

This paper examines the effect of trade integration and comparative advantage on one of a country's institutions, which in turn inuences its economic efficiency. The environment we explore is one in which a country's lower classes may revolt and appropriate wealth owned by a ruling elite. The...

The Department of Sanitation in New York City is a mayoral agency with a key role in municipal government, but it also has the attributes of a powerful corporation. With an annual budget in excess of a billion dollars, it hires, monitors, and replaces private vendors and contractors for a host...

Following the attempt by Alesina and Guiliano (2013) to measure global culture and to project these measurements onto real choropleth geographical world maps, we utilize the data from the World Values Survey (WVS) to arrive at robust measurement scales of global economic, political and social...

Dieser Beitrag untersucht den Einfluss vertikaler Zuweisungen (d.h. Zuweisungen einer übergeordneten Gebietskörperschaft an eine nachgeordnete Gebietskörperschaft) auf die Effizienz des kommunalen Sektors. Erstens wird ein theoretisches Modell entwickelt, in dem die Bürokraten den...

This paper studies the wasteful effect of bureaucracy on the economy by addressing the link between opportunistic behavior of government bureaucrats and the public sector wage bill. In particular, public officials are modeled as individuals competing for a larger share of those public funds. A...

Merit-based selection of bureaucrats is central to state capacity building, yet rare in developing countries. Most executives instead favor patronage -political discretion- in public employment. This paper proposes and tests an original theory to explain when executives forsake patronage for...

Merit-based selection of bureaucrats is central to state capacity building, yet rare in developing countries. Most executives instead favor patronage -political discretion- in public employment. This paper proposes and tests an original theory to explain when executives forsake patronage for...

Senior officials in the ministerial bureaucracy are responsible for the coordination of public service activity and their number has grown enormously since World War II. We study the growth in employment of this politically sensitive high-profile occupational group from a political economics...