Berge equilibrium offers an alternative to Nash equilibrium in game theory, emphasizing cooperative stability rather than individual optimization. Despite recent interest, a systematic study of Berge equilibria in finite normal form games is still lacking, with fundamental questions like...

I endogenize the probability of self‐fulfilling outcomes in a game where the only uncertainty comes from extrinsic sunspots. There is a group of players wishing to coordinate on the same action and another player-the regime defender-whose action affects the payoff from coordination. The...

This paper characterizes equilibrium properties of a broad class of economic models that al-low multiple heterogeneous agents to interact in heterogeneous manners across several markets. Our key contribution is a new theorem providing sufficient conditions for uniqueness and stability of...

We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric information where each player privately observes a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world V, resulting in dependent private observations. We study the structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) that use private beliefs in their strategies as...

A Nash equilibrium of a game in extensive form is a sequential equilibrium in mixed strategies if it can be approximated through equilibria of close-by games with slightly perturbed payoffs and small-probability behavioral types. We show that sequential equilibria in mixed strategies are...

This paper proves the existence of a non-stationary equilibrium in the canonical search-and-matching model with heterogeneous agents. Non-stationarity entails that the number and characteristics of unmatched agents evolve endogenously over time. An equilibrium exists under minimal regularity...

This paper revisits the n-player rent-seeking contest with homogeneous valuations and increasing returns. Our main result says that, for any m ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, there are threshold values 1 R∗(m) R∗ (m) ≤ 2 for the Tullock parameter R such that a pure strategy equilibrium with m...

We investigate a two-station queueing system where strategic customers must be sequentially serviced at both stations. We prove that an established property - that the distribution of the total time spent in a two-station system is independent of the chosen route when services times are...