We analyze investment decisions when information is costly, with and without delegation to an agent. We use a rational-inattention model and compare it with a canonical signal-extraction model. We identify three "investment conditions". In "sour" conditions, no information is acquired and no...

We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different distributions of prizes which motivate agents to compete to be first, avoid being last, or both. We find that the combined tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top...

The paper provides a framework for analysis of remuneration to agents whose task is to make well-informed decisions on behalf of a principal, with managers in large corporations as the most prominent example. The principal and agent initially bargain over the pay scheme to the latter. The...

We study a model of adverse selection, hard and soft information, and mentalizing ability-the human capacity to represent others' intentions, knowledge, and beliefs. By allowing for a continuous range of different information types, as well as for different means of acquiring information, we...

This paper studies a principal-agent model where a risk-neutral principal delegates to a risk-neutral agent the decision of whether to pursue a risky project or a safe one. The return from the risky project is unknown and the agent can acquire costly unobservable information about it before...

We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different distributions of prizes which motivate agents to compete to be first, avoid being last, or both. We find that the combined tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top...

We study a model of adverse selection, hard and soft information, and mentalizing ability-the human capacity to represent others' intentions, knowledge, and beliefs. By allowing for a continuous range of different information types, as well as for different means of acquiring information, we...

"This book brings an important new perspective to the study of sex trafficking by considering the different types of social contracts which existed in the past that had sexual labour or activity as an inherent component. It outlines the nature of these social institutions - marriage, temporary...

Выполнена систематизация подходов различных авторов к определению торговой операции на валютном рынке Forex. Выявлена проблема неточности толкования этого...

This paper analyzes a source of financing for commodity producers known as a streaming loan, where the producer makes periodic payments in proportion to their level of production. Streaming loans functions like a cropshare contract, whereas fixed rate debt is like a wage contract. Thus,...

Рассматриваются хозяйственные споры, возникновение которых является достаточно распространенным явлением в хозяйственной практике большинства предприятий и...

The contract is a legal instrument used to organize economic and social life. International trade agreement has certain features in order to ensure the international exchange of goods and services between the Contracting Parties. In terms of commercial contract, there is a foreign origin...

According to the abuse, unfair terms, contract, bank loan credit, consumer, professional, the concept of abuse is defined as a violation of law; an illegal act. The synonyms dictionary Synonyms (2002) sees abuse as an excess. From the NODEX perspective, abuse is defined as: 1) lack of measure;...

This is the first paper in the literature to formally study the cost impact of competitive tendering in rail maintenance. Sweden progressively opened up the market for rail maintenance services, starting in 2002. We study the cost impacts based on an unbalanced panel of contract areas between...

From a legal perspective, a contract has the binding force of law between the parties, so that problems arise when the obligor fails to fulfill its obligations, breaking the principle "pacta sunt servanda" and creating an imbalance between the contracting parties, in relation to the other...

This study examines the extent of income-shifting between tax bases among the owners of privately held businesses. The dual income tax system in Finland offers noticeable incentives for income-shifting between wages and dividends for business owners. The dividend tax reform of 2005 enables us to...

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...

Public-private partnerships (P3s) typically rely on long-term contracts between participants. When conditions arise that fall outside the expectations embodied in the contract, one party may seek to renegotiate the contract terms. Globally, the frequency of P3 contract renegotiations has been...

In most firms, if not all, workers are divided asymmetrically in terms of authority and responsibility. In this paper, we view the asymmetric allocations of authority and responsibility as essential features of hierarchy and examine why hierarchies often prevail in organizations from that...

This paper demonstrates that even established and verified facts of agreements among producers are not a sufficient condition for cartel identification and, as a consequence, prosecution of agreement participants. Such requires looking at institutional details and the wider context of these and...

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...

In this paper, we consider a knowledge accumulation problem within an organization. We depart from the human capital theory initiated by Becker (1962, 1964) and consider an organization that cannot prevent the worker from quitting and using the knowledge outside the organization. We study how...

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...

This paper develops a model of a competitive search credit market under hidden information and limited commitment. Using the model, it provides a theoretical account that links time delays and costs in financial intermediation as well as lack of collateral to the distribution of credit supply...

During negotiations, parties plan an exchange that will occur in the future and that implies a high level of uncertainty, regarding both contract conditions and final outcome. In this phase, parties are requested, according to country-specific legal framework, to act in good faith. As a matter...

The aim of this paper is to propose a new structure for classifying contract types and payment methods. Concerning the procurement contract types the first important feature is the stepwise structure with three main steps in the contract design: (1) should the contract only include construction...

This study examines vertical coordination in the wine industry emerging in Illinois. We find that quality matters as temporal issues related to grape perishability increase the probability of written contracts being used to procure grapes. Holdup concerns related to sourcing adequate quality...

In most firms, if not all, workers are divided asymmetrically in terms of authority and responsibility. In this paper, we view the asymmetric allocations of authority and responsibility as essential features of hierarchy and examine why hierarchies often prevail in organizations from that...

Bank demand guarantees have become an established part of international trade. This financial instruments are often used in trade financing when suppliers, or vendors, are purchasing and selling goods to and from overseas customers with whom they don't have established business relationships....

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...