Experiment participants in a social dilemma game choose cooperation over defection, even though neither is more beneficial. High levels of cooperation cannot be explained by favorable labels for actions, collusion, k-level reasoning, quantal response behavior, or misplaced optimism about others'...

Background: Logistics and transport, core of many business processes, are continuously optimized to improve efficiency and market competitiveness. The paper describes a modular coordination of vehicle routing and bin packing problems that enables independent instances of the problems to be...

This paper analyzes the mechanisms by which Stoic ethics can produce coordination. We study how agents satisfying the Stoic discipline of desires (that is, one should wish for nothing that is out of control, including other players'acts) behave in 2-player simultaneous symmetric coordination...

Objective: The purpose of this article is to examine the quality of remote primary healthcare in Poland measured through three dimensions: coordination, comprehensiveness, and continuity (3Cs) and examine the relationship between them. Research Design & Methods: The 3Cs were measured using a...

We study the role of purpose-based rules for behavior and outcomes in a threshold public good game. Rules can be sufficient or even inflated in terms of proposing a fulfilling behavior. We conduct a lab experiment to describe the implications caused by the inflation of a rule. Our study shows...

The threshold protocol game is a graphical game that models the adoption of an idea or product through a population. There are two states players may take in the game, and the goal of the game is to motivate the state that begins in the minority to spread to every player. Here, the threshold...

Truthful reporting about the realization of a publicly observed event cannot be guaranteed by a consensus process. This fact, which we establish theoretically and verify empirically, holds true even if some individuals are compelled to tell the truth, regardless of economic incentives. We...

Truthful reporting about the realization of a publicly observed event cannot be guaranteed by a consensus process. This fact, which we establish theoretically and verify empirically, holds true even if some individuals are compelled to tell the truth, regardless of economic incentives. We...

In this paper, we study cooperation and coordination in a threshold public goods game with asymmetric players where players have different endowments 𝑒𝑖, productivities 𝑝𝑖, and rewards 𝑟𝑖. In general, this game has a defective Nash equilibrium (NE), in which no one contributes,...

Market definition is essential for antitrust analysis, but challenging in settings with network effects, where substitution patterns depend on changes in network size. To address this challenge, we conduct an incentivized experiment to measure substitution patterns for TikTok, a popular social...

The global system we inhabit is often described in terms of markets, capital, and labor, but beneath these abstractions lies the deeper question of how coordination produces power and how power organizes coordination. Among the most influential traditions attempting to answer this question are...

Experiment participants in a social dilemma game choose cooperation over defection, even though neither is more beneficial. High levels of cooperation cannot be explained by favorable labels for actions, collusion, k-level reasoning, quantal response behavior, or misplaced optimism about others'...

This paper analyzes the mechanisms by which Stoic ethics can produce coordination. We study how agents satisfying the Stoic discipline of desires (that is, one should wish for nothing that is out of control, including other players'acts) behave in 2-player simultaneous symmetric coordination...

We develop a tractable model of competitive price cycles where prices are chosen alternatingly and consumers have heterogenous information. The model yields sharp empirical predictions about price patterns, impact of captive consumers and pass-through. Using rich station-level price data from...

We propose a framework for institutional change in the 'rules-in-equilibrium' tradition and introduce the term institutional incompleteness. Institutions are incomplete when their constituent rules fail to induce behavioural beliefs about the strategies of others and hence fail to achieve an...

We develop a tractable model of competitive price cycles where prices are chosen alternatingly and consumers have heterogenous information. The model yields sharp empirical predictions about price patterns, impact of captive consumers and pass-through. Using rich station-level price data from...

Using a sample of listed Chinese firms from 2007 to 2020, we investigate the governance implications of cross-ownership in corporate bond markets. We find that cross-ownership significantly reduces bond issuance spreads, suggesting that synergistic governance effects outweigh potential collusion...

Liberalisation and decarbonisation have transformed energy system coordination from internal engineering to a complex economic and digital challenge. Liberalisation replaced vertically integrated utilities with fragmented interactions among transmission operators, distribution operators,...

The Finnish labour market model has been undergoing a transformation since 2007, and the role of the public sector in the labour market model has sparked a lot of discussion. Wage-setting in the public sector is an important issue, as it has a direct impact on public finances and indirectly on...

I endogenize the probability of self‐fulfilling outcomes in a game where the only uncertainty comes from extrinsic sunspots. There is a group of players wishing to coordinate on the same action and another player-the regime defender-whose action affects the payoff from coordination. The...

We study static binary coordination games with random utility played on networks. In equilibrium, each agent chooses an action only if a fraction of her neighbors choosing the same action is higher than an agent‐specific i.i.d. threshold. A fuzzy convention x is a profile where (almost) all...

We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide between two actions (invest and not invest), the profitability of which depends on unknown...