The value of being a "team player" is not fixed - it depends on how work is organized. Using 1.5 million matches among 30,459 players in temporary teams formed by quasi-random matchmaking, we measure each player's coordination ability as a stable trait distinct from solo technical skill. This...

Experiment participants in a social dilemma game choose cooperation over defection, even though neither is more beneficial. High levels of cooperation cannot be explained by favorable labels for actions, collusion, k-level reasoning, quantal response behavior, or misplaced optimism about others'...

Background: The adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) in humanitarian logistics is essential for improving coordination and decision making, especially in the challenging landscape of disaster-relief settings. However, the current literature offers limited empirical evidence with respect to...

We study the role of purpose-based rules for behavior and outcomes in a threshold public good game. Rules can be sufficient or even inflated in terms of proposing a fulfilling behavior. We conduct a lab experiment to describe the implications caused by the inflation of a rule. Our study shows...

Objective: The purpose of this article is to examine the quality of remote primary healthcare in Poland measured through three dimensions: coordination, comprehensiveness, and continuity (3Cs) and examine the relationship between them. Research Design & Methods: The 3Cs were measured using a...

In a laboratory experiment, we study the role of fairness ideals as focal points in coordination problems in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. We elicit the normatively preferred behavior about how a subsequent coordination game should be played. In homogeneous groups, people share a unique...

In a laboratory experiment, we study the role of fairness ideals as focal points in coordination problems in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. We elicit the normatively preferred behavior about how a subsequent coordination game should be played. In homogeneous groups, people share a unique...

This paper analyzes the mechanisms by which Stoic ethics can produce coordination. We study how agents satisfying the Stoic discipline of desires (that is, one should wish for nothing that is out of control, including other players'acts) behave in 2-player simultaneous symmetric coordination...

Background: Logistics and transport, core of many business processes, are continuously optimized to improve efficiency and market competitiveness. The paper describes a modular coordination of vehicle routing and bin packing problems that enables independent instances of the problems to be...

Number systems are shared social technologies. They are heterogeneous, differing along dimensions of modality, base, and marking. These characteristics impart differential advantages depending on purpose and context, which explains why most cultures employ multiple number systems simultaneously....

The current method used by the US Government to calculate benefits and costs does not accurately measure the monetary value of some regulations. The problem is that the method fails to recognize the possibility that individual valuations, reflecting judgments in a relatively isolated,...

Using a behavioral game-theoretical model and an experiment we study how information and communication influence coordination in groups when they can misreport the outcome of a binary lottery. Both group members receive a positive payoff only if their reports match. Consistent with our theory,...

The threshold protocol game is a graphical game that models the adoption of an idea or product through a population. There are two states players may take in the game, and the goal of the game is to motivate the state that begins in the minority to spread to every player. Here, the threshold...

Truthful reporting about the realization of a publicly observed event cannot be guaranteed by a consensus process. This fact, which we establish theoretically and verify empirically, holds true even if some individuals are compelled to tell the truth, regardless of economic incentives. We...

Truthful reporting about the realization of a publicly observed event cannot be guaranteed by a consensus process. This fact, which we establish theoretically and verify empirically, holds true even if some individuals are compelled to tell the truth, regardless of economic incentives. We...

In this article, we examine the coordination effect of oligopolists' multimarket contact with asymmetric cost. We extend a model of infinitely repeated multimarket contact games with "symmetric advantage" in the seminal paper of Bernheim and Whinston (The RAND Journal of Economics 1990; 21(1):...

This article provides a practical overview for applying the global games approach to solve models with multiple equilibria that are often used in discussions on fi- nancial and macroprudential policies. Global games offer a tractable approach to resolve multiple equilibria by introducing...

We map the intellectual structure of teamwork in project management (PM) using a triangulated bibliometric design to interrogate 16,320 Scopus records (1966-November 2023). Three complementary lenses-keyword co-occurrence (topical cohesion), bibliographic coupling (research front), and...

In December 2025, Australia became the first country to ban youth under 16 years old from holding accounts on major social media platforms, a policy now under consideration in more than a dozen countries and in numerous states. Because social media use is inherently social, the effectiveness of...

Does artificial intelligence (AI) pose a threat to financial stability? We study AI investor behavior, specifically Q-learning and large language model (LLM) investors, in a mutual fund redemption problem with economic and strategic uncertainty. Different AI architectures generate systematically...

In this paper, we study cooperation and coordination in a threshold public goods game with asymmetric players where players have different endowments 𝑒𝑖, productivities 𝑝𝑖, and rewards 𝑟𝑖. In general, this game has a defective Nash equilibrium (NE), in which no one contributes,...

We propose a framework for institutional change in the 'rules-in-equilibrium' tradition and introduce the term institutional incompleteness. Institutions are incomplete when their constituent rules fail to induce behavioural beliefs about the strategies of others and hence fail to achieve an...