We analyze competition on nonlinear prices in homogeneous goods markets with consumer search. In equilibrium firms offer two-part tariffs consisting of a linear price and lump-sum fee. The equilibrium production is socially efficient as the linear price of equilibrium two-part tariffs equals to...

We analyze competition on nonlinear prices in homogeneous goods markets with consumer search. In equilibrium firms offer two-part tariffs consisting of a linear price and lump-sum fee. The equilibrium production is socially efficient as the linear price of equilibrium two-part tariffs equals to...

A new microeconomic model is presented that aims at a description of the long-term unit sales and price evolution of homogeneous non-durable goods in polypoly markets. It merges the product lifecycle approach with the price dispersion dynamics of homogeneous goods. The model predicts a minimum...

A new microeconomic model is presented that aims at a description of the long-term unit sales and price evolution of homogeneous non-durable goods in polypoly markets. It merges the product lifecycle approach with the price dispersion dynamics of homogeneous goods. The model predicts a minimum...

Conventional wisdom has it that network effects are strong in markets for homogeneous goods, leading to the dominance of one settlement currency in such markets. The alleged dominance of the dollar in global oil markets is said to epitomize this phenomenon. We question this presumption with...

Conventional wisdom has it that network effects are strong in markets for homogeneous goods, leading to the dominance of one settlement currency in such markets. The alleged dominance of the dollar in global oil markets is said to epitomize this phenomenon. We question this presumption with...

This paper models the possible effects over the market price of a homogeneous good when there is a merger. The analysis will be made with two scenarios: (i) using technologies homogenous between firms, (ii) and with any degree of heterogeneity. It is assumed an linear inverse function of demand...

The goal of this paper is to show how institutional and procedural characteristics affect the final price of the public procurement. In order to get comparable prices, only public procurement of homogeneous goods is analyzed. Presented model attempts to explain the variation in unit price as a...

The goal of this paper is to show how institutional and procedural characteristics affect the final price of the public procurement. In order to get comparable prices, only public procurement of homogeneous goods is analyzed. Presented model attempts to explain the variation in unit price as a...

We analyze dynamic price competition in a homogeneous goods duopoly, where consumers exchange information via word-of-mouth communication. A fraction of consumers, who do not learn any new information, remain locked-in at their previous supplier in each period. We analyze Markov perfect...

University of Minnesota M.S. thesis. March 2010. Major: Civil Engineering. Civil Engineering. Advisor: David M. Levinson. 1 computer file (PDF); viii, 36 pages. Ill. (some col.)

This paper investigates simultaneous move capacity constrained price competition game among three firms. I find that equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly are substantially different from those in the duopoly and symmetric oligopoly. I characterize mixed strategy equilibria and show there exist...

We analyze dynamic price competition in a homogeneous goods duopoly, where consumers exchange information via word-of-mouth communication. A fraction of consumers, who do not learn any new information, remain locked-in at their previous supplier in each period. We analyze Markov perfect...

We introduce the class of multisided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games which generalizes the well-known two-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games to markets with an arbitrary number of sectors. We reach the core and the corresponding extreme allocations of any multisided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game...

We introduce the class of multi-sided B ohm-Bawerk assignment games, which generalizes the well-kown two-sided B ohm-Bawerk assignment games to situations with an arbitrary number of sectors. We reach the extreme core allocations of any multi-sided B ohm- Bawerk assignment game by means of an...

I prove that, in assignment markets with more than two sides, agents of different sides (or sectors) need not be complements, whereas agents of the same side need not be substitutes. Shapley (1962) showed that this cannot happen when assignment markets are bilateral. Nevertheless, I found...

We introduce a subclass of multi-sided assignment games that embodies markets with different types of firms that produce different types of homogeneous goods. These markets generalize bilateral Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We describe the geometric and algebraic structure of the core, which is...