Search Results - subject_exact:"Implementation theory"

Implementing PBC as a procurement strategy in the public sector : understanding strategy-structure fit

Molitoris, Cornelia; Glas, Andreas; Eßig, Michael - 2025

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015453666

Behavioral implementation without unanimity

Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Zachariassen, Julius - 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014551784

Behavioral implementation without unanimity

Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Zachariassen, Julius - 2024

Behavioral implementation studies implementation when agents' choices need not be rational. All existing papers of this literature, however, fail to handle a large class of choice behaviors because they rely on a well-known condition called Unanimity. This condition says, roughly speaking, that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014465032

Fighting collusion : an implementation theory approach

Āzacis, Helmuts; Vida, Péter - 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015168498

Implementation in strong core by codes of rights

Lombardi, Michele; Savva, Foivos; Zivanas, Nikolas - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014253570

Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty

Narayanan, Aroon - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014253578

Cooperative security against interdependent risks

Gopalakrishnan, Sanjith; Sankaranarayanan, Sriram - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014430901

Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms

Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012373280

Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms

Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2020 - Revised version

We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration -...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012318860

Bidding against a buyout : implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value

Sun, Chaoran - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013538994

Efficient full implementation via transfers : uniqueness and sensitivity in symmetric environments

Ollár, Mariann; Penta, Antonio - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013253541

Unrestricted domain extensions of dominant strategy implementable allocation functions

Edelman, Paul H.; Weymark, John A. - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011925754

Dominant strategy implementability, zero length cycles, and affine maximizers

Edelman, Paul H.; Weymark, John A. - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011618362

Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles

Edelman, Paul H.; Weymark, John A. - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012663423

Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?

Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Vartiainen, Hannu - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012415645

Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation

Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012430240

Weak implementation

Pram, Kym - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012238458

The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation

Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015

In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010502711

Show 7 more versions 7

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation

Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - 2015

Book / Working Paper

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation

Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - 2015

Book / Working Paper

The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: An empirical investigation

Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - 2015

Book / Working Paper

The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation

Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015

Book / Working Paper

The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation

Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015

Book / Working Paper

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation

Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - 2015

Book / Working Paper

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation

Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - 2015

Book / Working Paper

The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation

Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom; Aghion, … - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011220298