"The Paris Agreement is a monumental triumph for people and our planet" (UN News Centre, 2015). Statements, like this one from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, represent the global excitement shortly after the acceptance of the Paris Agreement and describe the outcome of the COP21 in December...

This paper examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on the emissions abatement decisions of countries and on the stability of international environmental agreements. We consider two types of lobbies, industry and environmentalists. We determine the influence of lobby-groups on...

Increasing concerns about climate change have given rise to the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) as a possible solution to limit global pollution effects. In this paper, we study the stability of IEAs in a repeated game framework where we restrict to strategies which...

International environmental agreements have been and are negotiated to facilitate mitigation efforts on climate change. To avoid severe impacts, global cooperation is required as the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions represents a global public good. However, free-riding incentives impede the...

The research conducted at the Research Department "Environmental and Resource Economics, Environmental Management" at ZEW provides a better understanding of environmental policy instruments, national sensitivities, and strategies for overcoming the impediments to global climate policy. The...

Kurz vor dem anstehenden Klimagipfel äußert sich Angela Merkel in der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Sonntagszeitung wie folgt: "Zu Recht wird von Regierungen und Politikern erwartet, daß sie nicht länger die Augen vor erdrückenden wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen verschließen, daß der...

Die Klimakonferenz in Paris im Dezember 2015 wird jene Weichenstellung in der internationalen Klimapolitik vollziehen, die sich anlässlich der gescheiterten Klimakonferenz in Kopenhagen im Dezember 2009 erstmals abzeichnete.

The success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffusion of 'green' technologies. This requires that international environmental agreements (IEAs) and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) interact productively.Using a simple and tractable model, we...

Recent contributions to the theoretical and experimental literature suggest that minimum participation rules (MPRs) are able to reduce free-riding incentives and may facilitate cooperation (or at least coordination) at the extensive margin of international environmental agreements. Based on a...

This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...

This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...

This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...

Our purpose is to analyse the effectiveness and efficiency of a Partial Climate Agreement with open entry under a non-cooperative Nash-Equilibrium framework. We evaluate a partial agreement policy in which non-signatory countries can decide to join or to leave a coalition of the willing at any...

International climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate change are very large. In this paper, we examine the influence of increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages, also known as the 'fat tail', on the formation...