We leverage quasi-experimental variation to study how group size influences free-riding behavior within a high-expense environment. When buildings lack apartment-specific heat meters, tenants use simple heuristics to split a common bill. We estimate that the staggered rollout of a corrective...

Herein, we further examine how we can value nonmarket goods and services by considering the costs associated with environmental conflicts. Focusing on two American rules-the asymmetric reimbursement system and the contingent fee contract-we develop a strategic game-theoretic model in which a...

Environmental restoration as a compensatory mechanism for the development of previously undisturbed land can play a significant role in fulfilling nature conservation objectives. Numerous local authorities have adopted spatial planning frameworks that incorporate nature targets, such as "no net...

To evaluate the marginal welfare effects of taxation and of public spending, we must account for both distortionary and distributional effects. The distributional consequences of taxation, in terms of welfare, cannot be fully captured in in the measures currently used in the literature, such as...

The complexity of consumer free-riding behavior is a current significant problem, as modern online purchasing channels sharply compete with the traditional ones. The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of showrooming behavior by free-rider consumers on product valuation within a...

Experimentation is at the core of innovation. This project studies collaborative experimentation in teams, focusing on the inherent two-dimensional free-riding problem induced by payoff and informational externalities. The discouraging force of observing others' unsuccessful experimentation and...

This paper studies a large class of multi-agent contracting models with the property that agents' payoffs constitute a weighted potential game. Multiple equilibria arise due to agents' strategic interactions. I fully characterize a contracting scheme that is optimal for the principal for all...