Search Results - subject_exact:"Mechanism design"

Uras, Burak; Zaccaria, Niccolò - 2026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015619568

Divisive by design shaping values in optimal mechanisms

Prummer, Anja; Nava, Francesco - 2026 - 2., überarbeitete Auflage

We study a principal who allocates a good to agents with private, independently distributed values through an optimal mechanism. The principal can strategically shape these value distributions by modifying the good's features, which affect agents' valuations. Our analysis reveals that optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015609713

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Divisive by design : shaping values in optimal mechanisms

Prummer, Anja; Nava, Francesco - 2025

Book / Working Paper

Divisive by design shaping values In optimal mechanisms

Prummer, Anja; Nava, Francesco - 2025

Book / Working Paper

Stochastic optimization and coupling

Yang, Frank; Yang, Kai Hao - 2026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015615690

Information design and mechanism design : an integrated framework

Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen - 2026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015618926

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Information design and mechanism design : an integrated framework

Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen - 2026

Book / Working Paper

Existence of equilibrium mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems with interacting teams

Roberson, Brian - 2026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015644468

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Existence of equilibrium mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems with interacting teams

Roberson, Brian - 2026

Book / Working Paper

Principled mechanism design with evidence

Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian; Strausz, Roland - 2025

Casting mechanism design with evidence in the framework of Myerson (1982) implies that his generalized revelation principle directly applies, and we thus obtain standard notions of incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Their specific nature depends, however, on whether the presentation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015371822

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Principled mechanism design with evidence

Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian; Strausz, Roland - 2024

Book / Working Paper

Principled mechanism design with evidence

Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian; Strausz, Roland - 2023

Book / Working Paper

Robust pricing for cloud computing

Bergemann, Dirk; Deb, Rahul - 2025

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015271661

Optimal pricing of cloud services : committed spend under demand uncertainty

Bergemann, Dirk; Wang, Michael C. - 2025

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015271663

Matching in co-operative education programs : an experimental study

Ruffle, Bradley J. - 2025

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015191490

Mechanism design with private communication to neutralize fairness constraints

Daido, Kohei; Tajika, Tomoya - 2025

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015453105

Safe implementation in mixed nash equilibrium

Chopra, Anand; Gavan, Malachy James; Penta, Antonio - 2025

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015437702

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Safe implementation in mixed nash equilibrium

Chopra, Anand; Gavan, Malachy James; Penta, Antonio - 2025

Book / Working Paper

Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately

Liu, Tingjun; Bernhardt, Dan - 2025

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015475207

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Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately

Liu, Tingjun; Bernhardt, Dan - 2024

Book / Working Paper

Information transmission under privacy concerns

Zhang, Qiaoxi; Azacis, Helmuts; Ray, Indrajit - 2025

We study how privacy regulations impact information transmission. A receiver faces a decision whose payoff depends on an unknown state. A platform sends a message to her given a sensitive and a nonsensitive signal. Privacy loss occurs when the receiver updates about the former. When privacy is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015481477

Queueing to learn

Margaria, Chiara - 2025

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015419623

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Queueing to learn

Margaria, Chiara - 2025

Article

Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification

Silva, Francisco - 2024

I study a persuasion game between a privately informed agent and a decision maker (DM) who can imperfectly verify the statements made by the agent by observing a signal that is correlated with the agent's information. I find that whether or not the DM benefits from communicating with the agent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014635265

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Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification

Silva, Francisco - 2024

Article

Direct implementation with evidence

Banerjee, Soumen; Chen, Yi-chun; Sun, Yifei - 2024

We study full implementation with evidence in an environment with bounded utilities. We show that a social choice function is Nash implementable in a direct revelation mechanism if and only if it satisfies the measurability condition proposed by Ben-Porath and Lipman (2012). Building on a novel...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014576714

Mechanism design with costly inspection

Ahmadzadeh, Amirreza; Waizmann, Stephan - 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014529950

Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs

Zhang, Mengxi - 2024

I investigate the design of effort-maximizing mechanisms when agents have both private information and convex effort costs, and the designer has a fixed prize budget. I first demonstrate that it is always optimal for the designer to utilize a contest with as many participants as possible....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014468064

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Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs

Zhang, Mengxi - 2024

Article

Maximal matchings

Triêu, Anh; Bos, Iwan; Schröder, Marc; Vermeulen, Dries - 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014515520

Information requirements for mechanism design

MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - 2025

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015578113

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Information requirements for mechanism design

MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - 2024

Book / Working Paper

Information requirements for mechanism design

MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - 2023

Book / Working Paper

Mechanism design and innovation incentive for an ad-funded platform

Ichihashi, Shota; Jeon, Doh-Shin; Kim, Byung-Cheol - 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015123619

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Mechanism design and innovation incentive for an ad-funded platform

Ichihashi, Shota; Jeon, Doh-Shin; Kim, Byung-Cheol - 2024

Book / Working Paper

Optimal decision making under strategic behavior

Tsirtsis, Stratis; Tabibian, Behzad; Khajehnejad, Moein; … - 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015145567

Dynamic contracting with many agents

Biais, Bruno; Gersbach, Hans; Rochet, Jean-Charles; … - 2025

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015414813

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Dynamic contracting with many agents

Biais, Bruno; Gersbach, Hans; Rochet, Jean-Charles; … - 2024

Book / Working Paper

Dynamic contracting with many agents

Biais, Bruno; Gersbach, Hans; Rochet, Jean-Charles; … - 2024

Book / Working Paper

Multidimensional screening after 37 years

Rochet, Jean-Charles - 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015071983

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Multidimensional screening after 37 years

Rochet, Jean-Charles - 2024

Book / Working Paper

Divisive by design shaping values in optimal mechanisms

Prummer, Anja; Nava, Francesco - 2026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015614568

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Divisive by design shaping values In optimal mechanisms

Prummer, Anja; Nava, Francesco - 2025

Book / Working Paper

Reforming EU electricity market design : PPAs, CfDs, and long-term signals for a renewable-dominated system

Decarolis, Francesco - 2026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015609487

Strategy-proof mechanism design with boundedly rational agents : theory and experiment

Nishizaki, Katsuhiko - 2026

In a strategy-proof mechanism, implementation theory mostly assumes that each agent is rational in the sense that the agent reveals its true preference to induce its most preferred outcome. This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that the agent seeks such an outcome, but not necessary because...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015615338

The multiple-volunteers principle

Goldlücke, Susanne; Tröger, Thomas - 2026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015578337

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The multiple-volunteers principle

Goldlücke, Susanne; Tröger, Thomas - 2020

Book / Working Paper

Calibrated mechanism design

Doval, Laura; Smolin, Alex - 2026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015605624

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Calibrated mechanism design

Doval, Laura; Smolin, Alex - 2026

Book / Working Paper

Who chooses and who benefits? : the design of public school choice systems

Campos, Christopher; Bruhn, Jesse; Chyn, Eric; Vazquez, … - 2026

Public school choice has evolved rapidly in the past two decades, as districts roll out new magnet, dual-language, and themed programs to broaden educational opportunity. We use newly collected national data to document that opt-in (voluntary) systems: (i) are the modal design; (ii) are harder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015605966

A market design proposal for decoupling carbon and electricity prices

Finster, Simon; Kasberger, Bernhard; Rütten, Simon - 2026

In European day-ahead electricity markets, carbon allowance costs passed through by marginal fossil plants raise consumer expenditure and generate inframarginal rents for non-emitting generators. We propose a settlement modification: when the zonal day-ahead price exceeds a threshold,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015628815

Ex post strategy-proofness

Feng, Tangren; Wu, Qinggong - 2026 - This Version: February 5, 2026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015639587

Programmable fairness in electricity markets : a cost-causation–consistent alternative to marginal pricing

Sweeney, Shaun - 2026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015651183

Dynamic risk sharing with prepayment

Karajvanov, Alexander K. - 2026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015632619

Daycare matching with siblings : social implementation and welfare evaluation

Kuno, Kan; Moriwaki, Daisuke; Takenami, Yoshihiro - 2026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015632771

Soft-floor auctions : harnessing regret to improve efficiency and revenue

Bergemann, Dirk; Breuer, Kevin; Cramton, Peter C.; … - 2026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015669072

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Soft-floor auctions: harnessing regret to improve efficiency and revenue

Bergemann, Dirk; Breuer, Kevin; Cramton, Peter C.; … - 2025

Book / Working Paper

Dynamic risk adjustment in markets with persistent risk and manipulable signals : market design for health insurance

Chan, Alex - 2026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015665447

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Dynamic Risk Adjustment in Markets with Persistent Risk and Manipulable Signals : Market Design for Health Insurance

Chan, Alex - 2026

Book / Working Paper

Efficient dynamic mechanism design without a common prior

Bergemann, Dirk; Bojko, Marek - 2026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015670983

Evidence, beliefs, and the design of judicial mechanisms

Galasso, Alberto; Virág, Gábor - 2026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015637039

Outsourcing via reverse auction with a built-in menu of change orders

Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014304677

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Outsourcing via reverse auction with a built‐in menu of change orders

Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2022

Article

Value design in optimal mechanisms

Prummer, Anja; Nava, Francesco - 2023

A principal allocates a single good to one of several agents whose values are privately and independently distributed, employing an optimal mechanism. The principal shapes the distribution of the agents' values within general classes of constraints. Divisive product designs, which are either...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014309342

Pareto optimal anonymous mechanisms

Mukherjee, Conan - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014289318

The limits of ex post implementation without transfers

Feng, Tangren; Niemeyer, Axel; Wu, Qinggong - 2023

We study ex post implementation in collective decision problems where monetary transfers cannot be used. We find that deterministic ex post implementation is impossible if the underlying environment is neither almost an environment with private values nor almost one with common values. Thus,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014325191

Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification

Pereyra, Juan; Silva, Francisco - 2023

Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent. The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent's private information. The social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014325235

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Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification

Pereyra, Juan; Silva, Francisco - 2020

Book / Working Paper

Optimal carbon leakage

Hokkanen, Topi - 2023

Carbon leakage is one of the major issues facing policymakers today when designing environmental regulation. While the empirical and trade literature on carbon leakage is rich, much less is known about the implications of carbon leakage risk on optimal regulatory policies under asymmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014389026

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Optimal carbon leakage

Hokkanen, Topi - 2023

Book / Working Paper

Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary

Eilat, Ran; Pauzner, Ady - 2021

We study intermediaries who seek to maximize gains from trade in bilateral negotiations. Intermediaries are players: they cannot commit to act against their objective function and deny, in some cases, trade they believe to be beneficial. This impairs their ability to assist the parties relative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012806593

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Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary

Eilat, Ran; Pauzner, Ady - 2023

Book / Working Paper

Revenue maximization with partially verifiable information

Reuter, Marco - 2023 - Last update: November 8, 2023

I consider a seller selling a good to bidders with two-dimensional private information: their valuation for a good and their characteristic. While valuations are non-verifiable, characteristics are partially verifiable and convey information about the distribution of a bidder’s valuation. I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014440016

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