We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive at most one. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary transfers, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial Dictatorship, is characterized by equal-treatment-of-equals,...

In recent years, Belarus has experienced profound migratory shifts, driven by political repression, geopolitical tensions and regional conflicts. Following the disputed 2020 presidential elections, up to 500,000 Belarusians fled to neighbouring countries, with many seeking stability and...

This paper examines how network ties between local social leaders influenced the diffusion of mass protests in an autocracy. We focus on the Protestant Church and the Peaceful Revolution in East Germany. To quantify the role of leader networks in protest diffusion, we compile biographical...

This study explores the way in which social information about giving impacts the stability of distributional preferences. We designed a two-stage treatment which varied the information participants received about the maximum amounts given to recipients. Information on maximum giving can...

We present simple and direct arguments to characterize strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is of cardinality two. The underlying society is of arbitrary cardinality, and agents can be indifferent among alternatives.

Autocrats often control social organizations to disseminate their ideology. We examine the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile (1973-1990), where conservative military forces controlled female social organizations to promote traditional roles for women as mothers and housewives. Partnering with...

We study the effect of political regime change on higher education and its distributional and political consequences. We focus on the 1973 coup that brought Augusto Pinochet to power in Chile. The Pinochet dictatorship's aims of political control and fiscal conservatism led to a large reduction...

In prosocial decisions, decision-makers are inherently uncertain about how their decisions impact others’ utility – we call this interpersonal uncertainty. We show that people’s response to interpersonal uncertainty shapes well-known patterns of prosocial behavior. First, using standard...

Experiments are an important tool in economic research. However, it is unclear to which extent the control of experiments extends to the perceptions subjects form of such experimental decision situations. This paper is the first to explicitly elicit perceptions of the dictator and trust game and...

An extensive literature documents that people are willing to sacrifice personal material gain to adhere to a moral motive. However, less is known about the psychological mechanisms that operate when two moral motives come into conflict. We hypothesize that individuals adhere to the moral motive...

We develop a dynamic model in which a group collectively bargains with an external party. At each date the group makes an offer to the external party (the 'agent') in exchange for a concession. Group members hold heterogeneous preferences over agreements and are uncertain about the agent's...

Repression and information manipulation are two main tools of any modern authoritarian regime. Our theoretical model demonstrates how repression and propaganda complement each other: when the regime’s opponents are facing stricter punishment, the effect of persuasion is stronger, and...

Global public goods pose great risks, especially when the lack of these goods may have devastating consequences. Climate protection is such a good and it faces a triple dilemma: the so-called Westphalian dilemma of sovereign nation states, a weakest-link dilemma as the success of climate...

Gender differences have frequently been studied in experimental economics, but the findings remain inconclusive. In this study, we focus on gender differences in expectations and economic behavior in a dictator game, building on Blanckenburg, Iseke and Tebbe (2023). We add to prior work by...

A mechanism guarantees a certain welfare level to its agents, if each of them can secure that level against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it? In the n-person probabilistic voting/bargaining model with p deterministic...

We present and analyze a theory of cooperative bargaining under asymmetric information, based on the equity principles of the conditional random dictatorship—choosing with equal probability one of the individuals to act as a dictator under the participation constraint of the other players. Our...

We analyze media repression in Putin's Russia (2004-2019), a smart dictatorship that mimics democratic institutions, notably relatively free elections, and a relatively free press. Drawing on a unique granular dataset on journalist harassment and the pre-determined, staggered timing of local...

We study the selection of the political elite in an autocratic state. Using detailed CV data on potential politicians in the German Democratic Republic, we track and quantify the position of individuals in the state hierarchy over time and exploit exogenous connections between individuals that...