We study finite-player normal-form games with compact metric action spaces and bounded measurable payoffs. Our main theorem shows that every Nash equilibrium of such a game can be recovered as the limit, in the product weak topology, of Nash equilibria of finite games obtained by discretizing...

There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer normal-form games. While counterfactual regret minimization and fictitious play are...

The electricity-carbon coupled markets have emerged as a pivotal mechanism for integrating renewable energy into virtual power plants and accelerating decarbonization in the power sector. With the diversification of virtual power plant types and the continued evolution of peer-to-peer trading in...

Firms' efforts to reduce pollution emissions in their production processes are induced by market forces as well as governmental regulatory instruments. The market forces, which might induce firms to increase production to maximize profits, work at cross-purposes. One of the common solutions is...

The n-player Tullock contest with complete information is known to admit explicit solutions in special cases, such as (i) homogeneous valuations, (ii) constant returns, and (iii) two contestants. But can the model be solved more generally? In this paper, we show that key characteristics of the...

This paper studies mediation in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring. In departure from the literature, we assume that all private messages and internal records are publicly revealed at the end of each stage. We call the resulting equilibrium concept mediated subgame perfect...

The rapid development of network technology and live-streaming sales has facilitated the emergence of artificial intelligence digital human (AI) live-streaming technology, posing new challenges to traditional key opinion leader (KOL) live-streaming, particularly in highly competitive market...

Between 1959 and 1962, Alvin Scodel, J. Sayer Minas, and colleagues conducted some of the earliest laboratory studies of strategic interaction using non-zero-sum games. Working at the margins of economics in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, they documented a striking pattern: subjects...

This paper shows that a static trade-off model generates a negative cross-sectional relationship between leverage and profitability once ex ante Nash bargaining over the perpetual debt coupon is introduced. The central mechanism works as follows: higher shareholder bargaining power lowers the...

-- Chapter 1: Direct Taxes, Indirect Taxes, and Tax Sovereignty: Theoretical Foundations and Incidence Dynamics. -- Chapter 2: Global Tax Jurisdiction Shift and Wealth Redistribution: Context, Mechanisms, and China's Approach in Competition of Global Tax Sovereignty. -- Chapter 3:The Fiscal...

We have built and investigated analytically and numerically a differential game model of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of pollution, network structure, and continuous updating. Up to this time, games with network structure and continuous updating were considered separately. We analyzed...

We study experimentally a new model to study the effect of climate externalities and contractual incompleteness on network formation. We model a network where good/green firms enjoy direct and indirect benefits from linking with one another. Bad/brown firms benefit from having a connection with...

The publication of nearly 600,000 new species occurrence maps using Global Biodiversity Information Facility data provides an opportunity to reassess international species protection with broader representation for plants, invertebrates, and other species. This development aligns with the global...

GoBs are goods for which agents have non-monotonic preferences: more is beneficial only up to an ideal level, beyond which additional quantities become undesirable. We analyze public GoBs (non-excludable and non-rival) through a theoretical framework applicable to diverse contexts such as solar...

This paper examines the definition and continuity of expected payoffs in compact games with continuous payoff functions. There are three main results. First, we confirm that Glicksberg's (1952) original definition of expected payoffs as an iterated integral is mathematically sound under general...

We analyse the conditions for a particular type of mixed strategy profile to be an equilibrium in a specific buy and sell strategic market game à la Shapley and Shubik (1977), with two goods, using best responses of a player against random bids by the other players. We first identify a...