The n-player Tullock contest with complete information is known to admit explicit solutions in special cases, such as (i) homogeneous valuations, (ii) constant returns, and (iii) two contestants. But can the model be solved more generally? In this paper, we show that key characteristics of the...

This paper studies mediation in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring. In departure from the literature, we assume that all private messages and internal records are publicly revealed at the end of each stage. We call the resulting equilibrium concept mediated subgame perfect...

One‐shot public‐good situations are prominent in the public debate, and a prime example for behavior diverging from the standard Nash‐equilibrium. Could a Nash‐equilibrium predict one‐shot public‐good behavior in principle? A “revealed‐preference Nash‐equilibrium” ( rpne )...

In this work, we study n-agent Bayesian games with m-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called linear multidimensional Bayesian games. This class of games is equivalent with n-agent, m-game uniform multigames. We distinguish between games that have a discrete type space and those...

Hirshleifer's difference-form contest technology is a useful tool in the study of a class of conflict, especially military combats. We aim to highlight an important feature that the Hirshleifer contest model distinctively has, namely passivity (bidding zero effort) may stand as an effective...

We analyse the conditions for a particular type of mixed strategy profile to be an equilibrium in a specific buy and sell strategic market game à la Shapley and Shubik (1977), with two goods, using best responses of a player against random bids by the other players. We first identify a...

This paper proves the existence of a non-stationary equilibrium in the canonical search-and-matching model with heterogeneous agents. Non-stationarity entails that the number and characteristics of unmatched agents evolve endogenously over time. An equilibrium exists under minimal regularity...

Introducing new technology into a military force during an ongoing conflict presents significant challenges, extending beyond logistics to include the uncertainty of how effectively soldiers can adapt to and deploy the new capabilities. This study examines how the mastery of new technology...

We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric information where each player privately observes a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world V, resulting in dependent private observations. We study the structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) that use private beliefs in their strategies as...

We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete‐information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over to other agents. Our main result characterizes the...