This paper presents evidence from a large-scale study on gender differences in expected wages before labor market entry. Based on data for over 15,000 students, we document a significant and large gender gap in wage expectations that resembles actual wage differences, prevails across subgroups,...

This paper presents evidence from a large-scale study on gender differences in expected wages before labor market entry. Based on data for over 15,000 students, we document a significant and large gender gap in wage expectations that resembles actual wage differences, prevails across subgroups,...

This study investigates whether corruption differentially affects contracting through auctions and negotiations. Using data on Chinese land-market transactions, where corruption is known to be present, we first show that, on average, it exerts similar effects on transactions carried out via...

We use novel surveys of firms and workers, linked to administrative employer-employee data, to study the prevalence and importance of individual bargaining in wage determination. We show that simple survey questions accurately elicit firms' bargaining strategies. Using the elicited strategies...

Producers can leverage their bargaining power vis-'a-vis consumers by entering bargaining with debt. We discover novel general-equilibrium effects of such strategic debt by developing a money-search framework featuring heterogeneous consumers. Debt distorts trade along two margins: it destroys...

We study the design of efficient mechanisms under asymmetric awareness and information. Unawareness refers to the lack of conception rather than the lack of information. Assuming quasi-linear utilities and private values, we show that we can implement in conditional dominant strategies a social...

We conduct an artefactual field experiment in real-existing trade networks to analyze how individual network degree affects bargaining demands and outcomes. We combine data from a bilateral bargaining experiment with data of trade networks in 24 villages in Uganda. To identify the effect of...

We propose a standard search and bargaining model with divisible money, in which only the random matching market opens and the generalized Nash bargaining settles each trade. Assuming fixed production costs, we analytically characterize a tractable equilibrium, called a pay‐all equilibrium ,...

International climate negotiations have so far failed to produce ambitious climate cooperation. We combine laboratory experiments with simulations to investigate the performance of two negotiation design features to address this failure: The Paris Agreement's ratchet-up mechanism, which requires...

Information about decision-makers' preferences is essential for the efficient modeling of a conflict. However, obtaining this information becomes more challenging as the size of the conflict increases. To address this issue, this study proposes a new approach to the option prioritizing method...

The remarkable increase in the use of economic sanctions as a coercive tool of foreign policy over the past quarter century has been accompanied by an equally rapid growth in the number of academic and policy studies, which most often aim at quantifying the economic effects of sanctions and/or...

We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a...