This paper introduces a politico-economic model with a welfare state and immigration. In this model, policies on taxes and immigration are determined through a plurality voting system. While many studies of fiscal implications of immigration argue that relaxing immigration policies can...

What was the impact of urban political structure on economic inequality in preindustrial times? I document that more closed political institutions were associated with higher economic inequality in a panel of early modern German cities. To investigate the mechanisms behind that...

In this paper, I aim to discuss New Political Economy as a label for the economic analysis of politics, in the English language. The term ‘political economy’ itself, although it has ceased to be the preferred term by which economists refer to their discipline, it is still being used by a...

We study the strategic advantages of coarsening one’s utility by clustering nearby payoffs together (i.e., classifying them the same way). Our solution concept, coarse-utility equilibrium (CUE) requires that (1) each player maximizes her coarse utility, given the opponent’s strategy, and (2)...

This paper presents the results from a national survey experiment that tests how voters evaluate alternative voting rules, like ranked choice voting (RCV). We examine data from the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS), which allows for comparisons across racial groups. The...

We consider the design of a repeated contest in the presence of a potentially biased judge. Beliefs about the judge’s bias may discourage contestants from exerting effort. In a repeated contest, the identity of a previous winner influences these beliefs. The contest designer is able to commit...

A random assignment is robust ex-post Pareto efficient whenever for any of its lottery decomposition, each deterministic assignment in its support is Pareto efficient. We show that ordinal efficiency implies robust ex-post Pareto efficiency while the reverse does not hold. We know that...

Lawyers, judges, and professors have always been interested in the way cases unfold procedurally—their procedural posture. To date, however, nobody has provided a generalized theoretical framework to explain how procedural posture influences outcomes. This Article uses social choice theory to...

This paper presents a two-wave survey experiment on self-image concerns in voting. We elicit votes on a ballot initiative in Switzerland that spurred campaigns involving widely shared normative values. We investigate how messages that change the self-signaling value of a Yes vote affect...

This study aims to determine the effect of the teaching and learning process, learning motivation, and campus learning environment on student achievement in Economics and Administration in the 2019 academic year, Faculty of Economics, State University of Jakarta. This research is a quantitative...

This paper analyzes a model in which different rational individuals vote over the composition and time profile of public spending. Potential disagreement between current and future majorities generates instability in the social choice function that aggregates individual preferences. In...

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the doors did not suddenly slam shut on American immigrants when Congress passed the Emergency Quota Act of May 1921. Rather, the United States started imposing restrictions a half century earlier. Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and Canada enacted similar...

This study aims to see the effect of study habits, interest in learning, and learning environment on learning achievement. This study uses quantitative methods with a research sample of 233 people.The results of this study indicate that the influence of study habits providespositive results on...

We study how elected politicians who hold strong bargaining power due to their pivotal position in the legislative process use their leverage to benefit home district firms. U.S. senators from politically-centrist states possess greater political leverage than senators from politically-partisan...

This paper presents a theoretical and empirical investigation of tax competition when voters use the tax policy of neighboring jurisdictions as information to evaluate the performance of their incumbent politicians. We show that this has implications both for voter tolerance of high taxes and...

Fear of crime is a concern in developing countries where rule of law is imperfectly enforced. I use a cluster-randomized field experiment in Kenya to show that fear of theft imposes pervasive indirect costs on small-scale farmers, distorting their planting and time use decisions, as well as crop...

Voters often express support for a candidate whose policy platforms differ from their ideal policy preferences. We argue that under these circumstance acts of expressing support can causally change voters’ policy preferences. We conceptualize our arguments in a theoretical model of policy...

The main aim of this paper is to explore theoretically important mechanisms through which economic inequalities may affect the emergence of political violence given the forms of social mobilization they (may) generate. The paper identifies and explores two mechanisms under which social...

We explore the effect of oil import price shocks on political outcomes using a worldwide dataset on elections of chief executives. Oil import price shocks cause a reduction in the odds of reelection of incumbents, an increase in media chatter about fuel prices, and an increase in non-violent...

This study examines whether the rally 'round the flag phenomenon is present in the context of terrorist attacks, and investigates the explanations for the related increase of confidence in political institutions and political approval of the incumbent's job performance. I exploit variations in...

Environments with semi-ordered preferences, which may exhibit indifference intransitivity, are known to allow just-noticeable differences in preference intensity to serve as interpersonally comparable units of utility. I prove two impossibility theorems for social choice in such environments....

This paper develops a political-economic model of fiscal policy one in which" government resources are a common property' out of which interest groups can finance" expenditures on their preferred items. This setup has striking macroeconomic implications. " First, fiscal deficits and debt...

This paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences concerning fiscal policy alternate in office as a result of democratic elections. It is shown that in this situation government debt becomes a strategic variable used by each policymaker to influence the choices of...

This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents’ social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents’ social...

We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on a linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first of these relations is used to pare down the set of the feasible alternatives into a shortlist while the second is used to make a final...