Aid by altruistic donors may induce recipients to reduce their own contribution to development efforts in order to elicit more aid from donors. Help by well-intentioned donors may reduce the welfare of needy. Donors may not be able to deter deviant recipients as any punishment involves reducing...

This paper develops a two-period-two-country model in which an altruistic donor faces Samaritan's Dilemma to address two important policy questions: (i) whether foreign aid can lead to efficient level of capital investment in the recipient country and (ii) how do the form (e.g. budgetary...

The Samaritan’s dilemma problem is analyzed in the article. Based on the Buchanan’s model, the strategies formulated according to the classical decision theory criterions were considered. Here, the impact of all the decision strategies combinations was evaluated from the point of social...

The Samaritan’s dilemma problem is analyzed in the article. Based on the Buchanan’s model, the strategies formulated according to the classical decision theory criterions were considered. Here, the impact of all the decision strategies combinations was evaluated from the point of social...

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally's enemy. There is a signaling game between the third party and her ally's enemy...

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally’s enemy. There is a signaling game between the third party and her ally’s...

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally’s enemy. There is a signaling game between the third party and her ally’s...

This paper discusses the impact of foreign aid on the recipient country's preparedness against natural disasters. The theoretical model shows that foreign aid can have two opposing effects on a country's level of mitigating activities. In order to test the theoretical propositions we analyse the...

We show that a combination of temporariness and spending pressure is intrinsic to the aid relationship. In our analysis, recipients rationally discount the pronouncements of donors about the duration of their commitments because in equilibrium they know that some donors will honor those...

The objective of this paper is to illustrate a potential problem in Samaritan's dilemmas: that Samaritans have a vested interest in encouraging parasitism. In effect, they gain from their altruism. To demonstrate this result, we show that the Nash equilibrium in a Samaritan's dilemma is a Pareto...

When the government cannot commit to withdraw from providing charity health care, as is the case when it faces the Samaritan's Dilemma, a pub- lic health insurance scheme can be Pareto improving. However, the large heterogeneity in the design of such schemes observed around the world begs the...

The paper develops a model of an IMF-like coinsurance arrangement among member countries. First, it shows that a coinsurance arrangement among countries can, in principle, play a useful role in helping countries bear the risks involved in developing their economies and becoming part of the...

This article summarizes some propositions regarding economic dynamics and implications of two-sided altruism, on the basis of the human-capital-based OLG model of Ehrlich and Lui (1991), with application of a modified, fertility-endogenized definition of linearly separable two-sided altruism by...

Helping somebody may undermine his incentives to work. What Buchanan identified more than 25 years ago as the Samaritan's dilemma is basically a time-inconsistency problem. The paper discusses possible solutions of the dilemma such as punishment within an iterated game, reshaping the game in the...

Helping somebody may undermine his incentives to work. What Buchanan identified more than 25 years ago as the Samaritan's dilemma is basically a time-inconsistency problem. The paper discusses possible solutions of the dilemma such as punishment within an iterated game, reshaping the game in the...

Natural disasters occur in a political space. Although events beyond our control may trigger a disaster, the level of government preparedness and response greatly determines the extent of suffering incurred by the affected population. The authors use a political-economy model of disaster...

This paper discusses the impact of expected foreign aid in case of catastrophic events on the level of mitigative activities in aid-receiving countries. The theoretical model shows that the anticipation of foreign aid partly crowds out preventive collective action. The crowding-out effect can...