This paper examines the effect of financial sanctions on cross-border capital flows. While sanctions can be expected to hinder international transactions, thereby putting political and economic pressure on a target country, we study the patterns of adjustment in bilateral financial relationships...

Sanctions restrict cross-border interactions and, therefore, not only put political and economic pressure on the target country, but they also adversely affect the sender country. This paper examines the effect of financial sanctions on the country imposing them. In particular, we analyze the...

Sanctions restrict cross-border interactions and, therefore, not only put political and economic pressure on the target country, but they also adversely affect the sender country. This paper examines the effect of financial sanctions on the country imposing them. In particular, we analyze the...

Sanctions restrict cross-border interactions and, therefore, not only put political and economic pressure on the target country, but they also adversely affect the sender country. This paper examines the effect of financial sanctions on the country imposing them. In particular, we analyze the...

This paper assesses the information content of sanctions of listed companies pronounced by the French Financial Market Authority, through reactions from financial markets over the period 2004 to 2016. We answer whether, for a listed company, being named in a sanction report, as an offender, an...

Sanctions restrict cross-border interactions and, therefore, not only put political and economic pressure on the target country, but they also adversely affect the sender country. This paper examines the effect of financial sanctions on the country imposing them. In particular, we analyze the...

The Iranian economy has greatly benefited from the lifting of international sanctions in 2016, when the JCPOA nuclear deal came into force. Oil production and exports rebounded strongly, which spilled over into non-oil sectors. However, the economy is yet to return to its 1976 peak in real per...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

With the introduction of a new welfare benefit system in 2005, Germany implemented quite strict benefit sanctions for welfare recipients aged younger than 25 years. For all types of non-compliance except for missing appointments, their basic cash benefit is withdrawn for three months. A second...

We present results from a repeated public goods experiment where subjects choose by vote one of two sanctioning schemes: peer-to-peer (informal) or centralized (formal). We introduce, in some treatments, a moderate amount of noise (a 10 percent probability that a contribution is reported...

We build and estimate a non-stationary structural job search model that incorporates the main stylized features of a typical job search monitoring scheme in unemployment insurance (UI) and acknowledges that search effort and requirements are measured imperfectly. Based on Belgian data,...

We build and estimate a non-stationary structural job search model that incorporates the main stylized features of a typical job search monitoring scheme in unemployment insurance (UI) and acknowledges that search effort and requirements are measured imperfectly. Based on Belgian data,...

We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective sanction of the public officials is introduced when the number of officials accepting a bribe from firms reaches a certain threshold. We show that, despite the social risk, the pursuit of...

This paper examines the incentives of a firm to invest in information about the quality of its product and to disclose its findings. If the firm holds back information, it might be detected and fined. We show that optimal monitoring is determined by a trade-off. Stricter enforcement reduces the...

This paper examines the incentives of a firm to invest in information about the quality of its product and to disclose its findings. If the firm holds back information, it might be detected and fined. We show that optimal monitoring is determined by a trade-off. Stricter enforcement reduces the...

This paper examines the effect of financial sanctions on cross-border capital flows. While sanctions can be expected to hinder international transactions, thereby putting political and economic pressure on a target country, we study the patterns of adjustment in bilateral financial relationships...

International traders’ and investors’ expectations were raised after Iran had pledged to implement the landmark nuclear deal negotiated with the US, UK, France, Russia and Germany. While the Islamic Republic constitutes a trading hub with great economic potential, large amounts of goods or...

We designed a natural-field experiment in the context of local public transportation to test whether rewards in the form of lottery prizes coupled with traditional sanctions efficiently reduce free-riding. We organized a lottery in a medium-size Italian city the participation in which is linked...

We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective sanction of the public officials is introduced when the number of officials accepting a bribe from firms reaches a certain threshold. We show that, despite the social risk, the pursuit of...

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine that started in March 2014 resulted in bilateral economic sanctions imposed by Russia and Western countries, including the members of the euro area (EA). The paper investigates the impact of sanctions on the real side of the economy of Russia and the EA....

This paper examines the incentives of a firm to invest in information about the quality of its product and to disclose its findings. If the firm holds back information, it might be detected and fined. We show that optimal monitoring is determined by a trade-off. Stricter enforcement reduces the...

This paper examines the incentives of a firm to invest in information about the quality of its product and to disclose its findings. If the firm holds back information, it might be detected and fined. We show that optimal monitoring is determined by a trade-off. Stricter enforcement reduces the...

This study is an empirical attempt to find out whether under sanctions Iran’s trade direction has shifted away from Europe (trade policy of de-Europeanization) towards Asia (trade policy of Asianization). The analysis is conducted using a panel-gravity trade model to analyze bilateral trade...

The EU Action Plan on Drugs 2013-2016 requires EU member states to ‘provide, where appropriate and in accordance with their legal frameworks, alternatives to coercive sanctions (such as education, treatment, rehabilitation, aftercare and social integration) for drug using offenders’. The EU...

Introduction -- Defining the terms -- Iraq -- Taking on Iran -- On sanctions imposition and pain -- Pressure begins on Iran -- On target response and resolve -- Intense pressure on Iran and a turn to real negotiations -- On the search for inflection points -- Looking ahead

This book demonstrates how economic tools have been used throughout history to accomplish goals of military conflict, how they can be used more effectively than traditional means of warfare in the modern era, and how we can derive a better understanding of economic strategy applicable not just...