Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Suche nach möglichen Rechtfertigungen für zwingende Bestimmungen im Privatrecht. Da das Privatrecht stark vom Prinzip der Privatautonomie geprägt ist, werfen zwingende Bestimmungen die grundsätzliche Frage auf, ob diese wirklich notwendig...

This paper analyzes a mechanism through which a supplier of unknown quality can overcome its asymmetric information problem by selling via a reputable downstream rm. The supplier’s adverse-selection problem can be solved if the downstream rm has established a reputation for delivering high...

This thesis consists of three independent contributions in the area of microeconomic theory. All three contributions share the feature of agents holding multidimensional private information which motivates the title of the thesis. Part 1, entitled “Consistency and Communication in...

We consider a network that intermediates traffic between free content providers and consumers. While consumers do not know the traffic cost when deciding on consumption, a content provider knows his cost but may not control the consumption. We study how pricing consumers' and content providers'...

Information about the success of a new technology is usually held asymmetrically between the research and development (R&D)-performing firm and potential lenders and investors. This raises the cost of capital for financing R&D externally, resulting in financing constraints on R&D especially for...

We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante...

In vier Kapiteln beschreibe ich, wie Qualitätssignale die Wahrnehmung der Produkte im Kaufentscheidungsprozess beeinflussen. Aus meinen Ergebnissen leite ich Managementimplikationen und Vorschläge für die weitere Forschung ab. Ich konzentriere mich bei meinen Studien auf die Analyse und den...

We study a sequential screening problem where the agent produces an object consisting of multiple items and has a multidimensional type that he learns over time. Depending on the strength of complementarity/substitutability of the items, the optimal allocation features a different pattern of...

We study strategic information transmission in a Sender-Receiver game where players' optimal actions depend on the realization of multiple signals but the players disagree on the relative importance of each piece of news. We characterize a statistical environment - featuring symmetric loss...

We study strategic communication between a Sender and Receiver who are both uncertain about their preferred actions. The Sender observes noisy signals about both players' ideal policies and then communicates with the Receiver. Even though Sender and Receiver disagree about ideal policies as a...