Public good games in coalitional form, such as the ones depicting international environmental agreements for the reduction of a global pollutant, generally foresee scarce levels of cooperation. The incentive to free ride, that increases for higher levels of cooperation, prevents the formation of...

We use a ten-round online mind game to determine whether the effect of honesty nudges depends on timing and content. Reminding individuals about the right thing to do increases honesty. Including information that it is possible to assess an individual's dishonesty strengthens the effect of the...

Descriptive norms - the behavior of other individuals in one's reference group - play a key role in shaping individual decisions. When characterizing the behavior of others, a standard approach in the literature is to focus on average behavior. In this paper, we argue both theoretically and...

In this paper, we extend the individual evolutionary learning model by incorporating other-regarding considerations and apply the model to some Cournot games. Using the model fitted to the experimental data of a repeated 3-player Cournot game (with nonlinear cost and demand functions), we...

Humanity's problem with climate change has been likened to a "tragedy of the commons". If the atmosphere is seen as an open access dump for gasses like CO2 or methane, Garret Hardin's conclusion from 1968: "Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all" is obviously correct. But how do we create a...

Homann's method is a sophisticated theoretical model. As a result, it contains a normative foundation upon which Homann bases his endeavor, as well as numerous conclusions following his positive analysis. We propose extensions to both the normative and positive aspects of Homann's theory in this...

Does self-governance, a hallmark of democratic societies, foster or erode norms of generalized cooperation? Does this effect persist, and if so, why? I investigate these questions using a natural experiment in Switzerland. In the middle-ages, the absence of an heir resulted in the extinction of...

We consider a market economy where two rational agents are able to learn the distribution of future events. In this context, we study whether moving away from the standard Bayesian belief updating, in the sense of under-reaction to some degree to new information, may be strategically convenient...

Whether or not to vaccinate one’s child is a decision that a parent may approach in several ways. The vaccination game, in which parents must choose whether to vaccinate a child against a disease, is one with positive externalities (herd immunity). In some societies, not vaccinating is an...

Do groups and individuals behave differently in dictator games with varying deservingness of the recipient? Does the involvement in group-decision making affect the decisions of group members in subsequent individual decisions? We address these questions using a controlled dictator-game...

The rise of a new power may lead the dominant power to seek a preventive war. We study this scenario in an experimental two-stage bargaining game. In each stage, the rising power makes a bargaining offer and the declining power must choose whether to accept it or fight. Between the two stages,...

We provide an abstract framework for submodular mean field games and identify verifiable sufficient conditions that allow to prove existence and approximation of strong mean field equilibria in models where data may not be continuous with respect to the measure parameter and common noise is...

This study compiled a Bayesian inspection game as a branch in game theory to deal with non-performing loans (NPLs). Three types of games are analyzed, which are false alarm (FA), non-detection (ND), and bull's eye (BE). A Bayesian Nash equilibrium calculation process took place to formulate the...

The need for clean water is expected to substantially increase while further reductions of water availability in sufficient quantity and quality are projected owing to climate change and anthropogenic activities. Accordingly, the debate on water security has recently intensified and reached the...

I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium...

Many everyday activities are habitual. Among the most common human activities is communication. If people primarily communicate in a common-interests environment, they may form habits of truth-telling and believing messages. If they primarily communicate in a conflicting-interests environment,...

In this paper, we compared the models for selecting the optimal portfolio based on different risk measures to identify the periods in which some of the risk measures dominated over others. For decades, the best known return-risk model has been Markowitz's mean-variance model. Based on the...

This paper studies a simple process of demand adjustment in cooperative games. In the process, a randomly chosen player makes the highest possible demand subject to the demands of other coalition members being satisfied. This process converges to the aspiration set; in convex games, this implies...

This paper compares the results of an experiment conducted both in the laboratory and online with participants recruited from the same subject pool using the Trustlab platform. This platform has been used to obtain incentivized and internationally comparable behavioral economics measures of...

In this study, we tested the effect of time delays on sharing behavior. We conducted a dictator game to examine whether dictators change their sharing behaviors if they have more time between receiving and sharing money. When the response time was 2 hours, the sharing behavior of dictators was...

The paper provides theoretical foundations for models of strategic interdependence under uncertainty that have a continuum of agents and a decomposition of uncertainty into a macro component and an agent‐specific micro component, with a law of large numbers for the latter. This macro-micro...