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  • Search: subject_exact:"Unvollständiger Vertrag"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Unvollständiger Vertrag 1,973 Incomplete contract 1,886 Theorie 1,161 Theory 1,096 Vertragstheorie 328 Contract theory 324 Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie 276 Agency theory 268 Vertrag 179 Verhandlungstheorie 174 Contract 169 Leistungsanreiz 157 Bargaining theory 155 Performance incentive 154 Asymmetrische Information 144 Lieferantenmanagement 143 Supplier relationship management 143 Asymmetric information 138 incomplete contracts 123 Experiment 119 Investition 103 Investment 101 Transaktionskosten 97 Spieltheorie 95 Theorie der Unternehmung 94 Outsourcing 93 Game theory 92 Arbeitsvertrag 91 Theory of the firm 90 Transaction costs 90 Labour contract 85 USA 79 Eigentumsrechtstheorie 77 United States 77 Theory of property rights 74 Incomplete contracts 71 Moral Hazard 70 Moral hazard 69 Sunk Costs 68 Sunk costs 62
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Online availability
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Free 757 Undetermined 343
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 1,174 Article 799
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 753 Article in journal 686 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 686 Graue Literatur 683 Non-commercial literature 683 Arbeitspapier 670 Aufsatz im Buch 115 Book section 115 Hochschulschrift 88 Thesis 75 Collection of articles written by one author 18 Sammlung 18 Commentary 14 Kommentar 14 Systematic review 11 Übersichtsarbeit 11 Konferenzschrift 10 Forschungsbericht 9 Bibliografie enthalten 8 Bibliography included 8 Conference paper 7 Konferenzbeitrag 7 Case study 5 Fallstudie 5 Reprint 4 Collection of articles of several authors 3 Lehrbuch 3 Sammelwerk 3 Textbook 3 Aufsatzsammlung 2 Festschrift 2 Mehrbändiges Werk 2 Multi-volume publication 2 Article 1 Company information 1 Doctoral Thesis 1 Firmeninformation 1
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Language
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English 1,850 German 112 French 7 Italian 5 Spanish 4 Czech 2
Author
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Schmitz, Patrick W. 58 Fehr, Ernst 43 Schmidt, Klaus M. 38 Fahn, Matthias 35 Bös, Dieter 32 Felli, Leonardo 23 Aghion, Philippe 22 Grossman, Gene M. 19 Hart, Oliver D. 19 Falk, Armin 17 Herweg, Fabian 17 Defever, Fabrice 16 Gächter, Simon 16 Newman, Andrew F. 16 Tirole, Jean 16 Bester, Helmut 15 Bowles, Samuel 15 Brown, Martin 15 Harstad, Bård 15 Macchiavello, Rocco 15 Martimort, David 15 Anderlini, Luca 14 Bolton, Patrick 14 Legros, Patrick 14 Lülfesmann, Christoph 14 MacLeod, William Bentley 14 Malcomson, James M. 13 Nicita, Antonio 13 Watson, Joel 13 Helpman, Elhanan 12 Holden, Richard T. 12 Rainer, Helmut 12 Spagnolo, Giancarlo 12 Hendrikse, George W. J. 11 Kukharskyy, Bohdan 11 Moore, John 11 Müller, Daniel 11 Roider, Andreas 11 Antràs, Pol 10 Fischer, Christian 10
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Institution
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National Bureau of Economic Research 43 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 4 Institut for Nationaløkonomi <Kopenhagen> 3 Institut für Weltwirtschaft 3 East Lothian and Merse Whale Fishing Company 2 Georgetown University / Economics Department 2 Melbourne Business School 2 Metropolis-Verlag für Ökonomie Gesellschaft und Politik GmbH 2 University of Essex / Department of Economics 2 William Davidson Institute <Ann Arbor, Mich.> 2 Australian National University / Faculty of Economics and Commerce 1 Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag Doktor Th. Gabler 1 Bonn Graduate School of Economics 1 Center for Economic Research <Tilburg> 1 Center for International Development <Cambridge, Mass.> 1 Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet <Stockholm> 1 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas / Center for Latin American Economics 1 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas / Research Department 1 Foerder Institute for Economic Research <Tēl-Āvîv> 1 Harvard Institute of Economic Research 1 Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research <Mailand> 1 Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle 1 Institute of Finance and Accounting <London> 1 Internationaler Währungsfonds / Fiscal Affairs Department 1 Kiel Institute for the World Economy 1 Københavns Universitet / Økonomisk Institut 1 Massachusetts Institute of Technology / Department of Economics 1 Musselburgh Gas-Light Company 1 Shaker Verlag 1 Technische Universität Clausthal 1 University College London / Department of Economics 1 University of British Columbia / Finance Division 1 University of California, San Diego / Department of Economics 1 University of Cambridge / Department of Applied Economics 1 University of Dundee / Department of Economics & Management 1 University of Toronto / Department of Economics 1 Università commerciale Luigi Bocconi / Centro studi sui processi di internazionalizzazione 1 Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Seminar <29, 1999, Ottobeuren> 1 Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung / Abteilung Arbeitsmarktpolitik und Beschäftigung 1 World Bank / Development Research Group / Public Economics 1
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Published in...
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Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Policy Research 78 CESifo working papers 60 Working paper / National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 44 NBER working paper series 43 NBER Working Paper 34 Discussion paper series / IZA 31 The impact of incomplete contracts on economics 27 Discussion paper 21 Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 21 Economics letters 21 Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 21 Discussion papers / CEPR 20 European economic review : EER 19 The American economic review 19 The journal of law, economics, & organization 19 The review of economic studies 17 IZA Discussion Papers 16 Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences 15 CESifo Working Paper Series 14 CESifo Working Paper 13 Games and economic behavior 13 CESifo working papers : the international platform of Ludwig-Maximilians University's Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute 12 European journal of law and economics 12 Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 12 Discussion paper / A 11 International journal of industrial organization 11 The quarterly journal of economics 11 Europäische Hochschulschriften / 5 10 Journal of public economics 10 Journal of the European Economic Association 10 Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge : VWL ; discussion papers 10 The Rand journal of economics 10 Discussion paper series / Harvard Institute of Economic Research 9 Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics 9 IZA Discussion Paper 9 Journal of economic theory 9 Department of Economics discussion paper series / University of Oxford 8 Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute 8 Working papers / Harvard Business School, Division of Research 8 Journal of political economy 7
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Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 1,886 EconStor 85 RePEc 1 USB Cologne (EcoSocSci) 1
Showing 1 - 50 of 1,973
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Technology transfer in global value chains
Sampson, Thomas - 2022
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Technology transfer in global value chains
Sampson, Thomas - 2022
Firm-to-firm relationships in global value chains create opportunities for North-South technology diffusion. This paper studies technology transfer in value chains when contracts are incomplete and input production technologies are imperfectly excludable. The paper introduces a new taxonomy of...
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Trust and contracts : empirical evidence
D'Acunto, Francesco; Xie, Jin; Yao, Jiaquan - 2022
Trust between parties should drive contract design: if parties were suspicious about each others' reaction to unplanned events, they might agree to pay higher costs of negotiation ex ante to complete contracts. Using a unique sample of U.S. consulting contracts and a negative shock to trust...
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Economies of scope and relational contracts : exploring global value chains in the automotive industry
Helper, Susan; Munasib, Abdul - 2022
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Structural Loopholes in Sustainability-Linked Bonds
Ul Haq, Imtiaz; Doumbia, Djeneba - 2022
Sustainability-Linked Bonds (SLBs) – an innovative debt product that incorporates incentivized sustainability targets – are becoming increasingly popular to encourage issuers to improve their sustainability performance. However, existing SLB structures allow issuers to weaken the link...
Persistent link: https://ebtypo.dmz1.zbw/10013406145
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Structural Loopholes in Sustainability-Linked Bonds
Ul Haq, Imtiaz; Doumbia, Djeneba - 2022
Sustainability-Linked Bonds (SLBs) – an innovative debt product that incorporates incentivized sustainability targets – are becoming increasingly popular to encourage issuers to improve their sustainability performance. However, existing SLB structures allow issuers to weaken the link...
Persistent link: https://ebtypo.dmz1.zbw/10013406331
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Contract incompleteness and the boundaries of the firm in times of COVID-19
Bernasconi, Marta; Galetti, Sara; Gattai, Valeria; … - In: Journal of industry, competition and trade : from … 22 (2022) 3/4, pp. 371-409
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The costs and benefits of rules of origin in modern free trade agreements
Ornelas, Emanuel; Turner, John L. - 2022
We study the welfare impact of rules of origin in free trade agreements where final-good producers source customized inputs from suppliers within the trading bloc. We employ a property-rights framework that features hold-up problems in suppliers' decisions to invest, and where underinvestment is...
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Competition under incomplete contracts and the design of procurement policies
Carril, Rodrigo; Gonzalez Lira, Andres; Walker, Michael S. - 2022
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Relational contracts : public versus private savings
Dilmé, Francesc; Garrett, Daniel F. - 2022
Work on relational employment agreements often predicts low payments or termination for poor performance. The possibility of saving can, however, limit the effectiveness of monetary incentives in motivating an employee with diminishing marginal utility for consumption. We study the role of...
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Competition under incomplete contracts and the design of procurement policies
Carril, Rodrigo; Gonzalez Lira, Andres; Walker, Michael S. - 2022
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Socially responsible investment : ex-ante contracting or ex-post bargaining
Adachi-Sato, Meg - 2022 - Revised May 6, 2022
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International environmental agreements and black technology
Kollenbach, Gilbert - In: Environmental and resource economics 82 (2022) 3, pp. 601-624
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The costs and benefits of rules of origin in modern free trade agreements
Ornelas, Emanuel; Turner, John L. - 2022
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The organizational economics of school chains
Neri, Lorenzo; Pasini, Elisabetta; Silva, Olmo - 2022
Although school autonomy is often advocated as a way to improve student achievement, many countries are experiencing a counterbalancing trend: the emergence of 'chains' that bind schools together into structures with varying degrees of centralization. Despite their prominence, no evidence exists...
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Pricing and Quality Provision in a Supply Relationship : A Model of Efficient Relational Contracts
Nistor, Cristina; Selove, Matthew - 2022
We model how quality concerns affect the relationship between a firm and its supplier. A firm concerned about uncontractible quality for a customizable good has to pay higher prices to sustain a relationship with the supplier. If the customizable good has sufficiently volatile demand, then a...
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Overconfidence and Endogenous Contract Incompleteness
Bao, Te; Dai, Yun; Wang, Yongqin - 2022
We set up a model on the hold-up problem with uncertain bargaining power and find that, when agents are overconfident about their bargaining power ex ante, both of them may endogenously choose incomplete contract over complete contract even when complete contracting is feasible. The intuition...
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Introduction to the Oliver E. Williamson memorial issue
Langlois, Richard N. - In: Journal of institutional economics 18 (2022) 2, pp. 175-180
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(Bad) reputation in relational contracting
Deb, Rahul; Mitchell, Matthew F.; Pai, Mallesh M. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 763-800
Motivated by markets for ''expertise,'' we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with...
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Theoretical foundations of relational incentive contracts
Watson, Joel - University of California, San Diego / Department of … - 2021
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Pay transparency under subjective performance evaluation
Fahn, Matthias; Zanarone, Giorgio - 2021
This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using "subjective performance evaluation"). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization to pay its employees an "envy premium". This...
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Experiments on the hold-up problem and delegation
Yang, Yadi - 2021
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Contracting with endogenously incomplete commitment: escape clauses
Tangerås, Thomas P.; Gick, Wolfgang - 2021
We study mechanism design under endogenously incomplete commitment as it arises in contracting with escape clauses. An escape clause permits the agent to end a contractual relationship under specified circumstances, after which the principal can offer an ex-post contract. Escape clauses are...
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Pay transparency under subjective performance evaluation
Fahn, Matthias; Zanarone, Giorgio - 2021
This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using "subjective performance evaluation"). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization to pay its employees an "envy premium". This...
Persistent link: https://ebtypo.dmz1.zbw/10012418628
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Relational contracts and trust in a high-tech industry
Calzolari, Giacomo; Felli, Leonardo; Koenen, Johannes; … - 2021
We study how informal buyer-supplier relationships in the German automotive industry affect procurement. Using unique data from a survey focusing on these, we show that more trust, the belief that the trading partner acts to maintain the mutual relationship, is associated with both higher...
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The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings
Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Oexl, Regine - 2021
Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on effort provision in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate whether the impact of shocks is similarly...
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Contract duration and socially responsible investment
Adachi-Sato, Meg - 2021 - Revised: Feb 18, 2021
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Socially responsible investment : ex-ante contracting or ex-post bargaining
Adachi-Sato, Meg - 2021 - Revised: August 20, 2021
Persistent link: https://ebtypo.dmz1.zbw/10012643919
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Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
Kostadinov, Rumen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1471-1512
I study a repeated principal-agent game with long‐term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are observable but not contractible, so they can only be incentivized through implicit agreements formed in equilibrium. I show that contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for...
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Relational communication
Kolotilin, Anton; Li, Hongyi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1391-1430
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision‐making and signal the sender's information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium,...
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Balanced scorecards : a relational contract approach
Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - 2021
Reward systems based on balanced scorecards typically connect pay to an index, i.e. a weighted sum of multiple performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are non-verifiable so that the contracting parties must rely on self-enforcement....
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Balanced Scorecards : A Relational Contract Approach
Kvaloy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - 2021
Reward systems based on balanced scorecards typically connect pay to an index, i.e. a weighted sum of multiple performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are non-verifiable so that the contracting parties must rely on self-enforcement....
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Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle
Antras, Pol - 2021
The incomplete nature of contracts governing international transactions limits the extent to which the production process can be fragmented across borders. In a dynamic, general-equilibrium Ricardian model of North-South trade, the incompleteness of international contracts is shown to lead to...
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Competition and Well-Being
Brandts, Jordi; Riedl, Arno; Van Winden, F. A. A. M. - 2021
We study the effects of competition in a context in which people's actions can not be contractually fixed. We find that in such an environment the very presence of competition does neither increase efficiency nor does it yield any payoff gains for the short side of the market. We also find that...
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Undescribable Events
Al-Najjar, Nabil I.; Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - 2021
We develop a model of undescribable events. Examples of events that are well understood by economic agents but are prohibitively difficult to describe in advance abound in real-life. This notion has also pervaded a substantial amount of economic literature. We put forth a model of such events...
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An Economic Model of Child Custody
Francesconi, Marco; Muthoo, Abhinay - 2021
This paper develops a model of child custody based on an incomplete-contract approach to the allocation of property rights. Because of the presence of transaction costs in marriage, altruistic parents cannot contract upon the investments they make into their children, but can reduce the...
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Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)Complete Contract
Roider, Andreas - 2021
The present paper aims to contribute to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts by providing conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from...
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Democratic Mechanisms : Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs
Gersbach, Hans - 2021
We introduce democratic mechanisms where individual utilities are not observable by other people at the legislative stage. We show that the combination of three rules can yield efficient provision of public projects: First, flexible and double majority rules where the size of the majority...
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The Distribution of Talent and the Pattern and Consequences of International Trade
Grossman, Gene M. - 2021
In an economy with imperfect labor contracts, differences in the distribution of talent can be an independent source of comparative advantage. I study a world economy with two activities, one in which an individual's contribution to production can be measured accurately and another in which...
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Energy Taxes and Natural Gas Demand in Eu-Countries
Asche, Frank; Osmundsen, Petter; Tveteras, Ragnar - 2021
Producers or consumers faced with an increase in taxes are usually able to shift parts of it to other levels in the value chain. We examine who is actually bearing the burden of increased energy taxes in the EU-area - consumers or exporters. Traditional tax incidence theory presumes spot...
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Bureaucrats and Public Procurement
Bös, Dieter - 2021
This paper deals with a Niskanen type of public-procurement agency. It is shown that the procurement game should be separated into an investment game and a project game, the first game to be played before nature determines the actual realizations of benefit and costs of the project, the second...
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A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing : The "Boomerang" Effect and Grant-Back Clauses
Choi, Jay Pil - 2021
This paper develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on R&D competition in the innovation market and to examine the rationale for often observed grant-back clauses. Of particular concern are how the consideration of future...
Persistent link: https://ebtypo.dmz1.zbw/10013320934
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Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2021
We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that...
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Fairness and Retaliation : The Economics of Reciprocity
Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon - 2021
This paper shows that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic domains. It is an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances the possibilities of collective action greatly. Reciprocity may render the provision of explicit incentive...
Persistent link: https://ebtypo.dmz1.zbw/10013321166
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Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
Hart, Oliver; Moore, John - 2021
In the last few years a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper, we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been made of the theory, in...
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Imperfect Labor Contracts and International Trade
Grossman, Gene M. - 2021
In an economy with imperfect labor contracts, differences in the distribution of human capital are an independent source of comparative advantage. I study a world economy with two sectors, one where output is produced by teams and another where individuals can work alone. When workers' abilities...
Persistent link: https://ebtypo.dmz1.zbw/10013228727
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Testing Out Contractual Incompleteness : Evidence from Soccer
Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; Comin, Diego - 2021
The theory of incomplete contracting is rival to that of complete contracting as a frame of reference to understand contractual relationships. Both approaches rest upon diametrically opposed postulates and lead to very different policy conclusions. From a theoretical viewpoint, scrutiny of the...
Persistent link: https://ebtypo.dmz1.zbw/10013228753
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Outsourcing in a Global Economy
Grossman, Gene M.; Helpman, Elhanan - 2021
We study the determinants of the location of sub-contracted activity in a general equilibrium model of outsourcing and trade. We model outsourcing as an activity that requires search for a partner and relationship-specific investments that are governed by incomplete contracts. The extent of...
Persistent link: https://ebtypo.dmz1.zbw/10013229051
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The Macroeconomics of Specificity
Caballero, Ricardo J.; Hammour, Mohamad L. - 2021
Specific quasi-rents build up in a wide variety of economic relationships, and are exposed to opportunism unless fully protected by contract. The recognition that such contracts are often incomplete has yielded major insights into the organization of microeconomic exchange. Rent appropriation,...
Persistent link: https://ebtypo.dmz1.zbw/10013237014
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Relational Incentives Theory
Gallus, Jana; Reiff, Joseph; Kamenica, Emir; Fiske, … - 2021
Our life is built around coordinating efforts with others. This usually involves incentivizing others to do things, and sustaining our relationship with them. Using the wrong incentives backfires: it lowers effort and tarnishes our relationships. But what constitutes a ‘wrong’ incentive? And...
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