In this paper, we experimentally investigate the effect of public consumer ratings on market outcomes in credence goods markets. Contrary to search or experience goods, consumers cannot evaluate all dimensions of trade for credence goods, which may inhibit the information and reputation-building...

Technological progress offers new and promising ways to provide targeted information to consumers and facilitate behavioral change. We conduct a randomized controlled trial with a global supermarket chain and food producer to evaluate the effectiveness of a targeted information intervention that...

Credence-goods experiments have focused on stylized settings in which experts can perfectly identify the buyer’s best option and that option works without fail. However, in nature, credence goods involve uncertainties that complicate assessing the quality of service and advice. We introduce...

Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the information acquisition and provision decisions by...

In markets for credence goods - such as health care or repair services - fraudulent behavior by better informed experts is a common problem. Our model studies how four common features shape experts' provision behavior in credence goods markets: (i) diagnostic uncertainty of experts; (ii)...

This experiment examines the relationship between payment systems and the quality and quantity of services provided in credence goods markets. By using a real-effort task to stimulate the decision making of service providers, the study finds that payment systems do indeed have an impact on...

In markets for credence goods – such as health care or repair services – fraudulent behavior by better informed experts is a common problem. Our model studies how four common features shape experts’ provision behavior in credence goods markets: (i) diagnostic uncertainty of experts; (ii)...

Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the information acquisition and provision decisions by...

In markets for credence goods - such as health care or repair services - fraudulent behavior by better informed experts is a common problem. Our model studies how four common features shape experts' provision behavior in credence goods markets: (i) diagnostic uncertainty of experts; (ii)...

Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the information acquisition and provision decisions by...

Actors in various settings have been increasingly relying on algorithmic tools to support their decision-making. Much of the public debate concerning algorithms - especially the associated regulation of new technologies - rests on the assumption that humans can assess the quality of algorithms....

We study credence goods in a general model. A consumer may suffer a loss which is a continuous random variable. Privately observing the loss value, an expert can provide a repair at a price to eliminate the consumer's loss. All perfect-Bayesian equilibria are inefficient, in that some losses are...

We model competition on a credence market governed by an imperfect label, signaling high quality, as a rank-order tournament between firms. In this market interaction, asymmetric firms jointly and competitively control the underlying quality ranking's precision by releasing individual...

We report the results of an experiment to systematically investigate the influence of different settings in credence good markets on opportunism in the sellers' decisions. We find that, as predicted by a cognitive dissonance model, the specific choice of the design features might be less...

We analyze the effects of consumer feedback on a credence goods market where consumers sequentially visit a monopolistic expert. Each consumer faces a problem which can be either minor or major. The expert performs a diagnosis that may or may not reveal the severity of the problem and provides a...

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information concerning the needed and/or provided quality between experts and consumers. The functioning of the market heavily relies on trust on the side of the consumer as well as trustworthiness on the side of the expert. However, a great...

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information concerning the needed and/or provided quality between experts and consumers. The functioning of the market heavily relies on trust on the side of the consumer as well as trustworthiness on the side of the expert. However, a great...

In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such...

In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such...

Preventive dental care and automotive service is intended to prevent problems that, if they materialized, would require costly treatment or repair. In these markets fraud is both persistent and pervasive. This paper analyzes these markets invoking the notion of weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium...

We report the results of an experiment to systematically investigate the influence of different settings in credence good markets on opportunism in the sellers' decisions. We find that, as predicted by a cognitive dissonance model, the specific choice of the design features might be less...

Actors in various settings have been increasingly relying on algorithmic tools to support their decision-making. Much of the public debate concerning algorithms - especially the associated regulation of new technologies - rests on the assumption that humans can assess the quality of algorithms....

In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such...

We study a repeated credence goods market in which experts provide treatment to customers. We assume that the history of transactions is recorded on a biased review platform that contains information only about treatments, and not about non- treatments. We also introduce the notion of a partial...

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information concerning the needed and/or provided quality between experts and consumers. The functioning of the market heavily relies on trust on the side of the consumer as well as trustworthiness on the side of the expert. However, a great...

The growth of e-commerce and the increase in online product information—allowing consumers to learn about almost any product with incredible speed—brought with it the great promise of better-informed consumers that can make better purchasing decisions. However, information is not within the...

We study the role of beliefs about experts' honesty in a market for credence goods with second opinions and overtreatment. Experts are honest or dishonest. The population shares a common belief about the share of honest experts, which may be incorrect. We characterize the belief that maximizes...

Credence goods markets heavily rely on trust on the side of the consumer as well as trustworthiness on the side of the expert. In this paper, we study two determinants of trust and trustworthiness in experimental credence goods markets, namely the effect of a health frame as well as the identity...