We analyze a model of moral hazard in local public services which could be efficiently managed by officials under local democratic accountability, but not by officials who are appointed by the ruler of a centralized autocracy. The ruler might prefer to retain an official who diverted resources...

This paper uses a computational general equilibrium model to analyze the impact of public school finance regimes on rates of private school attendance. It is shown that, when viewed in such a general equilibrium context, state intervention in locally financed systems can have somewhat unexpected...

In China, local governments have actively contributed to the growth of new firms. In Russia, local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation, regulation, or corruption. There appears to be two main reasons behind the behavior of local governments in Russia. First,...

Many countries use centralized exit exams as a governance devise of the school system. While abundant evidence suggests positive effects of central exams on achievement tests, previous research on university-bound students shows no effects on subsequent earnings. We suggest that labor-market...

In this paper we empirically study the preferences of European citizens concerning the allocation of powers between EU and the Member States using Eurobarometer data from 1995 to 2003. Descriptive analysis highlights a ranking of countries according to their level of Europeanism, and a quite...

Previous research has shown that if countries "merge", (i.e. move to centralized policy choices) the effect is to reduce lobbying. However empirical evidence suggests that this is not always the case. This paper attempts to explain the empirical evidence in a two-jurisdiction political economy...

The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true...

Should a subset of member states of a federation be allowed to form a sub-union on some policy issue? When centralization is not politically feasible, allowing an enhanced cooperation agreement among a subset of countries permits the latter to gain benefits which would otherwise be lost....

Previous theoretical and empirical research has shown that policymakers have an incentive to centralize government activities in order to weaken the competitive pressure of fiscal federalism. We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to...

This paper examines policy centralization outcomes in a two-jurisdiction, political economy model of public good provision choices with heterogeneous policy preferences and interjurisdictional policy spillovers, under alternative democratic choice procedures, namely, direct democracy and...

"This book investigates the policies of the Thatcher, Major and Blair governments and their approaches towards concentration of economic and political power. The book will be of interest to students and scholars of contemporary British history, political economy and politics, as well as specific...

Recent debate has focused on the introduction of a central stabilisation capacity as a completing element of the Economic and Monetary Union. Its main objective would be to contribute cushioning country-specific economic shocks, especially when national fiscal stabilisers are run down. There are...

We propose a theory of tax centralization in politico-economic equilibrium. Taxation has dynamic general equilibrium implications which are rationally internalized at the federal, but not at the regional level. The political support for taxation therefore differs across levels of government....

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to supply basic insights into the principle of shūrā (consultation) in Islamic banking, the idea of a centralised approach to the corporate governance of Islamic financial institutions (IFIs), the roles of a centralised Sharīʿah board as the highest...

We provide a model with a federal government and multiple local governments, the former with power to levy an income tax for redistribution, and the latter choosing a local income tax, property tax, lump-sum tax or subsidy, and a local public good. Policy is set by majority choice at each tier...

We provide a model with a federal government and multiple local governments, the former with power to levy an income tax for redistribution, and the latter choosing a local income tax, property tax, lump-sum tax or subsidy, and a local public good. Policy is set by majority choice at each tier...

We investigate the degree of leeway donors of foreign aid should grant to recipient governments when their preferences over how to implement the aid are different, and both the donor and recipient possess some private information about the most effective policies. Intuitively, our model shows...

Does decentralization affect how voters attribute blame for poor economic performance? The question of whether political centralization ties regime leaders to local economic outcomes is particularly important in authoritarian regimes, where economic performance legitimacy is a key source of...

We first study theoretically how intergovernmental relations affect political budget cycles (PBCs) within federal countries, introducing a national incumbent that favors aligned districts in a model where discretionary fiscal policy is subject to credibility problems. Then we analyze Argentina's...

Current European integration very much focusses on harmonisation and convergence. This streamlining goes far beyond what is demanded by economic reasoning and turns out - as the euro crisis has demonstrated - to foster tensions among EU member states instead of promoting a flourishing common...

We propose a theory of tax centralization and inter governmental grants in politico-economic equilibrium. The cost of taxation differs across levels of government because voters internalize general equilibrium effects at the central but not at the local level. This renders the degree of tax...

We propose a theory of tax centralization and inter governmental grants in politico-economic equilibrium. The cost of taxation differs across levels of government because voters internalize general equilibrium effects at the central but not at the local level. This renders the degree of tax...

Current European integration very much focusses on harmonisation and convergence. This streamlining goes far beyond what is demanded by economic reasoning and turns out - as the euro crisis has demonstrated - to foster tensions among EU member states instead of promoting a flourishing common...

We provide a potential explanation for the absence of, and unwillingness to create, centralized power in the hands of a national state based on the political agenda effect. State centralization induces citizens of different backgrounds, interests, regions or ethnicities to coordinate their...