We study a model of auction design where a seller is selling a set of objects to a set of agents who can be assigned no more than one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pair need not be quasilinear. If the domain contains all classical preferences, we show that there is a...

In an auction, each party bids a certain amount, and the one who bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all-pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all-pay auction,...

Using 33 years of intraday Treasury data, we provide the first high-frequency evidence on auction-day price pressure: yields rise in the hours before auction and reverse afterward. This pressure strengthens when dealers face tighter risk-bearing constraints and weakens when investor demand is...

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on a continuous Japanese-English auction in a common-value 'wallet game'. The main objective is to test whether bidders follow the equilibrium bidding strategy predicted by theory. We find systematic deviations from equilibrium behaviour:...

The Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) promotes non-price criteria in renewable auctions. It aims to unlock green willingness-to-pay and scale up manufacturing capacity for net-zero technologies in the European Union (EU). This paper builds a partial equilibrium model of the European solar module...

Multi-unit common value auctions in which bidders submit demand functions are used for a variety of purposes, including selling government debt (Treasury auctions) and allocating liquidity (repo auctions). Typically, either a discriminatory or a uniform-price format is used. In this paper, we...

We study the problem of distributing subsidies in a market that includes both marginal individuals in need of assistance and infra-marginal individuals who would purchase the subsidized product without additional incentives. We propose the use of a wait time auction, where individuals bid the...

We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about winning the object and a receivers inference about their type. Signaling concerns arise in various economic situations such as takeover bidding, charity auctions, procurement...

This study investigates whether corruption differentially affects contracting through auctions and negotiations. Using data on Chinese land-market transactions, where corruption is known to be present, we first show that, on average, it exerts similar effects on transactions carried out via...

Heterogeneous interconnections, which link regulated electricity markets to liberalised ones, are becoming increasingly important. Several such interconnections are set to be established in the near future especially between European and North African countries (e.g., Tunisia-Italy,...

By combining vegetable and fish production in a closed-loop system, aquaponics is a promising technology to contribute to sustainable food production. However, information about consumer preferences for aquaponic products is limited and most studies measure willingness to pay hypothetically. The...

We investigate profit-share auctions in a procurement context,comparing them with traditional cash auctions to identify which mechanism yields lower expenses for buyers. We also explore whether specifying a high project value in profit-share auction contracts influences supplier bidding...

We investigate how buyer-supplier communication affects procurement prices, comparing auctions without direct communication to negotiations allowing it. In controlled experiments involving students and procurement professionals, we find communication increases prices, disadvantaging buyers....

Sellers face a critical choice: run competitive auctions or strike exclusive deals with preferred buyers. Contrary to conventional wisdom that sellers should rely on open competition, we show that a powerful seller optimally commits to a sequential `flexclusivity' arrangement - a strategic mix...

This study explores how sustainability-related information affects consumers' willingness to pay for Pistacchio Verde di Bronte PDO, a luxury agri-food product. Using an experimental auction with multiple price lists and random-effects interval regression models, the results show that...

We characterize Nash equilibria in multi-product markets in which producers commit to vectors of supply functions contingent on all prices. The framework accommodates (dis)economies of scope in production, and goods may be substitutes or complements in demand. We show that equilibrium...

We propose a new way to obtain identification results using order statistics as finite mixtures with two key properties: i) the weights are known integer numbers; and ii) the elements of the mixture are the distributions of the maximum over a subset of the original random variables. We leverage...

We investigate profit-share auctions in a procurement context, comparing them with traditional cash auctions to identify which mechanism yields lower expenses for buyers. We also explore whether specifying a high project value in profit-share auction contracts influences supplier bidding...

We analyze vertical integration in auction markets using a symmetric independent private-values model where the auctioneer invests in the auctioned object's quality. We find that the auctioneer invests more after integration. The integrated bidder enjoys a bidding advantage over other bidders....

In response to rising global government debt, sovereign debt management offices (DMOs) are increasingly refining their issuance methods to optimize investor engagement and minimize borrowing costs. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of a two-stage Treasury auction design that incorporates a...

This report supports the European Commission (DG ENER) in the design and implementation of a European import auction for renewable hydrogen and its derivatives under the European Hydrogen Bank (EHB). The EHB aims to contribute to the EU's climate neutrality goal by 2050. While domestic auctions...

We develop a method for detecting cartels in multistage auctions. Our approach allows a firm to be collusive when facing members of its cartel yet competitive when facing others. Intuitively, as initial bids are shaded, close initial bids not only imply similar costs but also provide an...