We study a model of auction design where a seller is selling a set of objects to a set of agents who can be assigned no more than one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pair need not be quasilinear. If the domain contains all classical preferences, we show that there is a...

In an auction, each party bids a certain amount, and the one who bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all-pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all-pay auction,...

Using 33 years of intraday Treasury data, we provide the first high-frequency evidence on auction-day price pressure: yields rise in the hours before auction and reverse afterward. This pressure strengthens when dealers face tighter risk-bearing constraints and weakens when investor demand is...

We study a principal who allocates a good to agents with private, independently distributed values through an optimal mechanism. The principal can strategically shape these value distributions by modifying the good's features, which affect agents' valuations. Our analysis reveals that optimal...

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on a continuous Japanese-English auction in a common-value 'wallet game'. The main objective is to test whether bidders follow the equilibrium bidding strategy predicted by theory. We find systematic deviations from equilibrium behaviour:...

The lithium battery energy storage system (ESS) faces problems such as market price fluctuation and uncertainty of frequency modulation (FM) signals when participating in power market. Day-ahead bidding behavior bears revenue risk and real-time bidding behavior needs to adjust. It is necessary...

The Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) promotes non-price criteria in renewable auctions. It aims to unlock green willingness-to-pay and scale up manufacturing capacity for net-zero technologies in the European Union (EU). This paper builds a partial equilibrium model of the European solar module...

Price premia between day-ahead and intraday electricity markets are well documented and often attributed to factors such as forecast errors or market frictions. However, existing explanations provide limited insight into why these price premia can exhibit a systematic diurnal structure, as...

Multi-unit common value auctions in which bidders submit demand functions are used for a variety of purposes, including selling government debt (Treasury auctions) and allocating liquidity (repo auctions). Typically, either a discriminatory or a uniform-price format is used. In this paper, we...

Casting mechanism design with evidence in the framework of Myerson (1982) implies that his generalized revelation principle directly applies, and we thus obtain standard notions of incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Their specific nature depends, however, on whether the presentation of...

We study the problem of distributing subsidies in a market that includes both marginal individuals in need of assistance and infra-marginal individuals who would purchase the subsidized product without additional incentives. We propose the use of a wait time auction, where individuals bid the...

We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about winning the object and a receivers inference about their type. Signaling concerns arise in various economic situations such as takeover bidding, charity auctions, procurement...

Many auctions and procurement contests entail nontrivial bidding costs, which makes the bidders’ participation decisions endogenous to the auction design. We analyze the effect of different auction rules on potential bidders’ incentives to participate. We focus on first-price auctions with...

Heterogeneous interconnections, which link regulated electricity markets to liberalised ones, are becoming increasingly important. Several such interconnections are set to be established in the near future especially between European and North African countries (e.g., Tunisia-Italy,...

By combining vegetable and fish production in a closed-loop system, aquaponics is a promising technology to contribute to sustainable food production. However, information about consumer preferences for aquaponic products is limited and most studies measure willingness to pay hypothetically. The...

We investigate profit-share auctions in a procurement context,comparing them with traditional cash auctions to identify which mechanism yields lower expenses for buyers. We also explore whether specifying a high project value in profit-share auction contracts influences supplier bidding...

We investigate how buyer-supplier communication affects procurement prices, comparing auctions without direct communication to negotiations allowing it. In controlled experiments involving students and procurement professionals, we find communication increases prices, disadvantaging buyers....

Sellers face a critical choice: run competitive auctions or strike exclusive deals with preferred buyers. Contrary to conventional wisdom that sellers should rely on open competition, we show that a powerful seller optimally commits to a sequential `flexclusivity' arrangement - a strategic mix...

This paper examines the welfare implications of priority service in a frictional search environment with heterogeneous outside options. Priority search facilitates expedited matching with public options in the market by charging a service premium. Our main analysis demonstrates that a...

Priority-based allocation often requires eliminating justified envy, making serial dictatorship (SD) the only non-wasteful direct mechanism with that property. However, SD's outcomes can conflict with the policymaker's objectives. We introduce visible fairness, a framework where fairness is...

We characterize Nash equilibria in multi-product markets in which producers commit to vectors of supply functions contingent on all prices. The framework accommodates (dis)economies of scope in production, and goods may be substitutes or complements in demand. We show that equilibrium...

We consider a package assignment problem with money, in which a set M of objects is allocated to agents. Each agent has preferences that are not necessarily quasi-linear. The admissible set of object allocations is chosen by the planner to pursue specific objectives in conjunction with the rule....

We propose a new way to obtain identification results using order statistics as finite mixtures with two key properties: i) the weights are known integer numbers; and ii) the elements of the mixture are the distributions of the maximum over a subset of the original random variables. We leverage...

We investigate profit-share auctions in a procurement context, comparing them with traditional cash auctions to identify which mechanism yields lower expenses for buyers. We also explore whether specifying a high project value in profit-share auction contracts influences supplier bidding...