In this study, we use the dynamic programming method introduced by Mirică (2004) to solve the well-known war game of attrition and attack as formulated by Isaacs (1965). By using this modern approach, we extend the classical framework to explore optimal strategies within the differential game...

This paper develops a dynamic model of tender offers in which there is trading on the target's shares during the takeover, and bidders can freeze out target shareholders (compulsorily acquire remaining shares not tendered at the bid price), features that prevail on almost all takeovers. We show...

We study the feasibility and profitability of predation in a dynamic environment, using a parsimonious infinite-horizon, complete information setting in which an incumbent repeatedly faces potential entry. When a rival enters, the incumbent chooses whether to accommodate or predate it; the...

We investigate the role and performance of imitative behavior in a class of quantity-setting, Cournot games. Within a framework of evolutionary competition between rational, myopic best-response and imitation heuristics with differential heuristics' costs, we found that the equilibrium stability...

We study the interaction between an agent of uncertain type, whose project gives rise to both good and bad news, and an evaluator who must decide if and when to fire the agent. The agent can hide bad news from the evaluator at some cost, and will do so if this secures her a significant increase...

In this paper, we formulate a differential game model to investigate firms’ competition in both price and product R&D. The significant features of our research include: (i) incorporating the factor of network effects into the framework of continuous dynamic competition; (ii) considering the...

This paper investigates a multi-periodic channel optimization facing uncertain, price dependent, and dynamic demand. The picture of the market uncertainty is incomplete, and only the price and time-dependent mean and standard deviation are known and may depend on the price history. The actual...

This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes' correlated equilibrium Bergemann and Morris (2016) to multistage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.

This study proposes a logical Petri net model to leverage the modeling advantages of Petri nets in handling batch processing and uncertainty in value passing and to integrate relevant game elements from multi-agent game processes for modeling multi-agent decision problems and resolving...

Should a challenger face rivals simultaneously or sequentially? If sequentially, should he face weak or strong rivals first? To address these questions, we study signaling in dynamic contests, where a privately-informed challenger faces a sequence of rivals. Against heterogenous opponents, the...

We consider in discrete time, a general class of sequential stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information with the following features. The underlying system has Markovian dynamics controlled by the agents' joint actions. Each agent's instantaneous utility depends on the current system...

We propose a dynamic pricing game of incomplete information where firms' beliefs about competitors' prices can be biased. These biases create a coordination problem to achieve a collusive outcome. We apply the model to study the initiation stage of a price-fixing cartel in the Chilean...