Partisanship of state level politicians affect the impact of federal fiscal policy in the U.S. Using data from close gubernatorial elections, we find partisan differences in the marginal propensity to spend federal transfers since the early 1980's: Republican governors spend less. A New...

In economic unions the fiscal authority consists not of one, but many governments. We analyze whether partisanship of state-level politicians affects federal policies, such as fiscal stimulus in the U.S. Using data from close elections, we find partisan differences in the marginal...

This book analyses ancient Greek federalism by focusing on one of the most organised and advanced Greek federal states, the Achaean Federation Sympoliteia. Unlike earlier studies that mainly focused on its political history, this book adopts an interdisciplinary approach, analysing aspects of...

This book analyses ancient Greek federalism by focusing on one of the most organised and advanced Greek federal states, the Achaean Federation Sympoliteia. Unlike earlier studies that mainly focused on its political history, this book adopts an interdisciplinary approach, analysing aspects of...

We study the efficiency of centralized fiscal spending by supranational unions, where participation is voluntary. In this setting, a country's outside option during budget negotiations is to withdraw its contribution to the centralized budget and consume its full income. This implies a crucial...

We study fiscal spending by supranational unions, where participation is voluntary and countries bargain over contributions to and the allocation of a central budget. We explore the link between the allocation and nations ́contributions that occurs since bargaining power is endogenous, and...

We study fiscal spending by supranational unions, where participation is voluntary and countries bargain over contributions to and the allocation of a central budget. We explore the link between the allocation and nations' contributions that occurs since bargaining power is endogenous, and...

The paper provides an equilibrium analysis of how countries compete for migrants. The type of competition (tax or transfer competition) depends on whether the competing countries have similar policy preferences. With symmetric preferences, countries compete in taxes for migrants. With asymmetric...

The paper provides an equilibrium analysis of how countries compete for migrants. The type of competition (tax or transfer competition) depends on whether the competing countries have similar policy preferences. With symmetric preferences, countries compete in taxes for migrants. With asymmetric...

Recent experience with disasters and terrorist attacks in the US indicates that state and local governments rely on the federal sector for support after disasters occur. But these same governments are responsible for investing in infrastructure designed to reduce vulnerability to natural and...