Competition authorities increasingly rely on economic screening tools to identify markets where firms deviate from competitive norms. Traditional screening methods assume that collusion occurs through secret agreements. However, recent research highlights that firms can use public announcements...

Utilizing Connor's International Cartel Database and employing difference-in-differences methodology, we find that market concentration, the number of buyers and cartel duration have significant impacts on cartel overcharges. We also find that the European Commission's 2006 guidelines on the...

There are many evidences which prove that cartels’ price leads to an economic inefficiency, due to the reduced consumers welfare. Antitrust authorities have set up different ways to defeat and prevent collusive agreements, but as widely showed by the literature, deterring collusion may have...

This paper examines how the Brazilian ready-mix concrete cartel expanded through mergers and acquisitions. Specifically, we investigate whether cartel firms strategically acquired non-aligned competitors to optimize market dominance, eliminate competition and sustain collusive behavior.Using...

We develop a method for detecting cartels in multistage auctions. Our approach allows a firm to be collusive when facing members of its cartel yet competitive when facing others. Intuitively, as initial bids are shaded, close initial bids not only imply similar costs but also provide an...

Competition authorities increasingly rely on economic screening tools to identify markets where firms deviate from competitive norms. Traditional screening methods assume that collusion occurs through secret agreements. However, recent research highlights that firms can use public announcements...

Using a sample of listed Chinese firms from 2007 to 2020, we investigate the governance implications of cross-ownership in corporate bond markets. We find that cross-ownership significantly reduces bond issuance spreads, suggesting that synergistic governance effects outweigh potential collusion...

This paper explores algorithmic collusion from both legal and economic perspectives, underscoring the increasing influence of algorithms in firms’ market decisions and their potential to facilitate anti-competitive behaviour. By employing bandit algorithms as a model—typically used in...

Competition authorities increasingly rely on economic screening tools to identify markets where firms deviate from competitive norms. Traditional screening methods assume that collusion occurs through secret agreements. However, recent research highlights that firms can use public announcements...

It is well-known that failing to achieve key organizational goals may pressure managers to commit fraud, but can it be a facilitating factor in cartel formation as well? The purpose of this study is to understand if firms known to have been in a cartel were under financial stress in the period...

Competition authorities impose substantial penalties on firms engaging in illegal pricefixing. We examine how basing cartel fines on either revenue, profit, or price overcharge influences cartel and market prices, as well as cartel incidence and stability. In an infinitely repeated Bertrand...

This study analyzes the impact of patent rights on duopolistic competition with price leadership. The willingness of companies with significant patent rights to form a cartel was assessed. The main aim of the analysis was to determine the role of patents in maintaining the stability of the...

Utilizing Connor's International Cartel Database and employing difference-in-differences methodology, we find that market concentration, the number of buyers and cartel duration have significant impacts on cartel overcharges. We also find that the European Commission's 2006 guidelines on the...

This paper investigates partial cartels, which laboratory studies have neglected despite their empirical prevalence. We conduct two laboratory experiments to understand how they function compared to all-inclusive cartels and respond to antitrust policies. First, we compare partial cartel...

This is a review of the 2023 IASOC Prize Winner Trying to Make It: The Enterprises, Gangs, and People of the American Drug Trade. By R.V. Gundur. Gundur offers a masterful account of the inner workings of the illicit drugs trade from the Mexico-US Border into the USA. His ethnography examines...

The theory of convenience addresses white-collar and corporate crime. The theory is applied in this article to a case study of Norwegian publishing houses having to pay infringement fees because of competition act violation. Cartel members agreed and coordinated a boycott of a distribution...

This article explores the history of international softwood timber trade from the late 19 th century until the 1970s, focusing on governance and the interplay between public and private sectors. By examining the roles of business associations and international networks, it highlights how these...

A bonus on the fine in response to the defendant running a corporate compliance program is superfluous because working leniency programs provide all the incentives necessary to implement efficient compliance. Others opposed to such a bonus argue that unreduced fines are sufficient to incentivize...

Corporate sustainability due diligence (CSDD) is needed in order to achieve a transition towards a green economy and deliver the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Therefore, the Commission proposed the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) in 2019. In March 2024, the Council...

Following the judgment of the Court of Justice and especially the Opinion of the Advocate General in the CDC Hydrogen Peroxide case, arbitration agreements on disputes concerning damages for infringements of the competition rules of the TFEU have been interpreted as being contrary to the...