Mancur Olson explained in The Logic of Collective Action (1965) that the free rider problem and the paradox of participation discourage rational consumers from taking collective action to oppose policies that disadvantage them. The lack of grassroots opposition to 'nanny state' policies from...

This Brief studies patterns of political engagement among private firms in the European Union (EU). Using representative data, allowing for analysis at the level of NUTS2 regional groupings (EU regions varying from about 800,000 to 3 million inhabitants), various patterns of engagement emerge....

This working paper was prepared in 2024 and reviews developments internationally since 2021 relating to the exercise of the right to bargain collectively and the existence of collective agreements among workers in the platform economy. The paper builds upon ILO Working Paper 80, "Realizing the...

Collective action is essential during times of crisis. Yet, while some actors are able to use the momentum to initiate new collective action, others struggle to maintain existing collective action due to differences in immediate crisis responses. Thus, to act collectively in a crisis, it is a...

This policy brief explores the implications of the Netherlands' transposition of the new EU Product Liability Directive (PLD), focusing on its interaction with the Dutch collective action system. As one of the first EU countries to implement PLD and a key hub for mass litigation, the Netherlands...

Interrelated global crises - climate change, pandemics, loss of ecosystem services and biodiversity - pose risks that demand collective solutions. Uncertainty about others' behavior, coupled with the dependence on some to take collective efforts to mitigate risks for all (e.g. conservation of...

Efficient coordination is a major source of efficiency gains. We study in an experimental coordination game with 718 children and teenagers, aged 9 to 18 years, the strategies played in pre-adulthood. We find no robust age effects in the aggregate, but see that smaller group sizes and larger...

When formal insurance is unavailable, mutual insurance among households can serve as an alternative. This paper analyzes a game between economic agents facing uncertainty and maximizing discounted utility without enforceable contracts or access to capital markets. While autarky is always a...

We study cooperation in an environment where public good providers face the decision to accept a newcomer to their group. A bottom-up process for accepting new members to social groups reveals individual preferences to include newcomers. Alternatively, inclusion can be decided in a top-down...

Efficient coordination is a major source of efficiency gains. We study in an experimental coordination game with 718 children and teenagers, aged 9 to 18 years, the strategies played in pre-adulthood. We find no robust age effects in the aggregate, but see that smaller group sizes and larger...

Efficient coordination is a major source of efficiency gains. We study in an experimental coordination game with 718 children and teenagers, aged 9 to 18 years, the strategies played in pre-adulthood. We find no robust age effects in the aggregate, but see that smaller group sizes and larger...

We introduce a novel concept, group image concerns, showing that individuals change their behavior and are willing to incur personal costs to cultivate a positive image of their groups. We develop an experimental method to identify and quantify group image concerns, and conduct a series of...

Using a laboratory experiment, we study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good that is provided if and only if the fraction of contributors reaches a certain threshold. We jointly vary the size of the group, the cost of contributing, the required threshold, and the framing...

Using a laboratory experiment, we study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good that is provided if and only if the fraction of contributors reaches a certain threshold. We jointly vary the size of the group, the cost of contributing, the required threshold, and the framing...

We examine the effect of cognitive processes on collective action in a social dilemma using two experiments with cognitive manipulations. Our experiments use a two-stage game: In the first stage, participants vote on implementing formal sanctions to be applied in a second-stage public goods...