This paper analyzes how ESG-linked executive compensation interacts with carbon taxation in a multitask principal-agent framework. A risk-neutral principal with financial and environmental preferences incentivizes a risk-averse manager to exert productive and abatement effort while facing an...

The debate over CEO compensation persists despite extensive efforts by academics and technocrats to understand its determinants. Most research has focused on how firm-specific characteristics and CEO-specific traits influence CEO compensation. However, the results have been contradictory,...

This paper analyzes how ESG-linked executive compensation interacts with carbon taxation in a multitask principal-agent framework. A risk-neutral principal with financial and environmental preferences incentivizes a risk-averse manager to exert productive and abatement effort while facing an...

We show that executives' early-life poverty experiences reduce both internal (executive-employee) and external (executive-peer) corporate pay disparities. Three mechanisms drive this effect: increased risk aversion in poverty-exposed executives, strategic avoidance of negative media coverage to...

This study investigates the effect of government pay policy for chief executive officer's (CEO's) compensation on corporate innovation (CI). Furthermore, it explores the role of the CEO's career horizon and shareholding in this nexus. Utilizing the difference-in-differences method to analyze...

This paper uses the Brexit referendum in 2016 as a quasi-natural experiment to estimate the effect of an exogenous negative shock to globalization on executive compensation for German companies listed in the DAX and MDAX stock indices. We show that it matters whether they work for firms...

This paper contributes to the ongoing discourse on the taxation of top-income earners by empirically investigating the impact of tax policy changes on pay without performance. Using data on executive compensation in the United States, I compare the sensitivity of executive compensation to...

In this paper, we investigate the effect of higher personal income taxes on CEO and firm performance in publicly traded US firms. In response to higher taxes on compensation, CEOs are less likely to reach performance goals and spend more time working in boards outside of their firm. At the same...

The subjective judgment and discretionary actions of a manager can influence the core strategy, investment, operations, and decision-making of a company. Managerial actions from the top, particularly the board, plays a vital role in addressing this inclination. While scholars have shown interest...

Inspired by the limited research regarding the influence of CEO succession origin on corporate misconduct, this study draws on organizational identification theory and agency theory to examine this issue. Empirical analysis indicates that insider CEOs significantly constrain corporate misconduct...

The growing compensation disparity between CEOs and employees has become a global concern, underscoring the need for regulatory measures to ensure fair and equitable remuneration practices. Drawing insights from China's government regulation of CEO compensation (GRCC) for state-owned enterprises...

Using a regulation that increased portfolio disclosure frequency of US mutual funds as an exogenous shock shortening funds' investment horizon, we examine whether and how affected funds influence portfolio firms to achieve horizon realignment after the shock. We find that portfolio firms reduce...