ndustrial policy has returned to the centre of economic governance, particularly in the high-tech sectors where positive network externalities in demand make market dominance self-reinforcing. This paper studies the welfare effects of an industrial policy targeting a sector with network...

In this article, we examine the coordination effect of oligopolists' multimarket contact with asymmetric cost. We extend a model of infinitely repeated multimarket contact games with "symmetric advantage" in the seminal paper of Bernheim and Whinston (The RAND Journal of Economics 1990; 21(1):...

In the photo film market of the 2000s, Kodak's failure to sufficiently reduce production in response to market shrinkage has become a canonical example of how firms fail to adjust to market shrinkage. This seemingly optimistic response contrasts sharply with Fujifilm's response, which ultimately...

We analyze the relationship between collusion sustainability in an infinitely repeated game using trigger strategies and the elasticity of substitution. To this end, we adopt a demand function with constant elasticity of substitution between the differentiated goods. Since our model exhibits a...

We present a new dynamic model of corporate investment in imperfectly-competitive product markets, extending the neoclassical (Q) theory of capital to a multi-firm, multi-product, fullystructural model. Our model embeds a state-of-the-art hedonic demand system, endogenizes firms' markups and...

We study information design in a vertically differentiated market. A third party publicly discloses information about the product qualities of two competing firms. More precise information improves consumer matching but increases perceived differentiation, enabling firms to raise prices....

This paper analyzes the contemporary development of artificial intelligence (AI) as a concentrated technological regime characterized by scaling dynamics, cumulative learning processes, and infrastructural control. Departing from approaches that treat AI as an exogenous technological shock, the...

It is shown that staggered and sticky price adjustment is possible without ad hoc frictions, and without suspending full price flexibility. I consider an oligopoly with n price-setting firms which can strategically choose the timing of price decisions and thus the stage in a n-stage Stackelberg...

Algorithms pose interesting challenges to competition law, particularly discussing which practices involving this fast-paced technologies may or should be caught under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"). As AI-driven pricing algorithms become increasingly...

We characterize the time-consistent solution to the cartel-fringe model of exhaustible resource extraction when the cartel acts as a von Stackelberg leader and renewable substitutes exist. For this feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium (FBSE), we show for each combination of stocks which...

We present a new dynamic model of corporate investment in imperfectly-competitive product markets, extending the neoclassical (Q) theory of capital to a multi-firm, multi-product, fully-structural model. Our model embeds a state-of-the-art hedonic demand system, endogenizes firms' markups and...

We have built and investigated analytically and numerically a differential game model of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of pollution, network structure, and continuous updating. Up to this time, games with network structure and continuous updating were considered separately. We analyzed...

A major section of the existing literature on strategic trade policy, following a partial equilibrium framework, observed that imposition of tariff by the domestic country leads to a rise in their wage level. Analysis on the impact of strategic trade policy intervention (tariff) on wages and...

State governments provide grants to students to subsidize college attendance. In response, colleges can adjust their tuition, aid policies, and admission standards, affecting equilibrium enrollment and pass-through of aid to students. To quantify demand- and supply-side responses, I develop a...

We study the propensity of independent algorithms to collude in repeated Cournot duopoly games. Specifically, we investigate the predictive power of different oligopoly and bargaining solutions regarding the effect of asymmetry between firms. We find that both consumers and firms can benefit...

I study the expenditures of the Comédie française from 1759 to 1793 and the company's debt from 1723 to 1793. Expenditures were well controlled and changes in venues account for their increase over time. The debt, however, was less controlled, because of the company's partnership structure and...

We characterize Nash equilibria in multi-product markets in which producers commit to vectors of supply functions contingent on all prices. The framework accommodates (dis)economies of scope in production, and goods may be substitutes or complements in demand. We show that equilibrium...

We study information design in a vertically differentiated market. Two firms offer products of ex-ante unknown qualities. A third party designs a system to publicly disclose information. More precise information guides consumers toward their preferred product but increases expected product...

This paper derives a closed-form expression linking aggregate markups on im- ported inputs to concentration in a model of firm-to-firm trade with two-sided market power. Our theory extends standard oligopoly insights in two dimensions. First, it reveals that markups increase with exporter...

We analyse UK markups and profit margins for the pandemic period and its aftermath using unconsolidated balance sheets of non-financial corporations for both listed and unlisted firms. The markup increases by 14.7% between 2014 and 2022, exceeding any previously documented growth rate for UK...