We develop a simple two-period principal-agent model in which a present-biased government, the agent, chooses public investment levels given a deficit rule imposed by the principal. The principal sets a deficit cap to curb current debt-financed consumption. In doing so, it also reduces long-term...

We study a dynamic principal-agent setting in which both sides learn about the importance of effort. The quality of the agent's output is not observed directly. Instead, the principal jointly designs an evaluation technology and a wage schedule. More precise performance evaluation reduces...

This study examines the performance of family businesses through the theoretical lenses of dynamic capabilities and socioemotional wealth. A conceptual model is proposed, in which socioemotional wealth moderates the relationship between dynamic capabilities and family firm performance. The...

Purpose - We investigate the relationship between family firms and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover and the moderating role of corporate transparency in this association, using firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE). Design/methodology/approach - Using a sample of 15,726 firm-year...

In the context of differentiated governance and the deepening market-oriented reform of compensation in China, we divide state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into four categories according to their equity structure, namely absolute holding firms, relative holding firms, major impact firms and equity...

In this study, we examine two adjudication methods designed to resolve disputes between principals and agents concerning bonus payments in relationships characterized by moral hazard and where the parties have been forced to use soft, imprecise, and subjective information to align incentives....

In this study, we focus on managerial incentives provided by debt-like compensation and further investigate whether and to what extent such managerial incentives may affect CEOs' decisions on risk management. Building on cumulative prospect theory and instrumental stakeholder theory, we propose...

This paper empirically examines the impact of CEO narcissism on corporate financialization using Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009-2022. The results find that CEO narcissism leads to corporate financialization, and the promotion is more significant in lower cash flow,...

We develop a model of Ponzi schemes with asymmetric information to study Ponzi frauds. A long-lived agent offers to save on behalf of short-lived agents at a higher rate than they can earn themselves. The long-lived agent may genuinely have a superior savings technology, but may be an imposter...