Welche neuen und bislang wenig beachteten Themen werden die Unternehmenskommunikation in Zukunft prägen? Der Communication Management Radar 2026 identifiziert interdisziplinäre Phänomene in Management, Technologie, Psychologie und Medien, die sich gerade konkretisieren und in naher Zukunft zu...

This study endeavors to scrutinize the impact of board characteristics on firm performance directly as well as through the moderating influence of institutional ownership. Tobin' Q and market-to-book ratio are the proxies of firm performance as dependent variable. The analytical approach...

This article provides a novel insight into whether earnings manipulation signals are reflected in banks' internal credit risk estimates, as measured by the probability of default (PD) estimates, and whether such manipulation has an impact on credit risk (point in time or deferred). The...

We study a model of auction design where a seller is selling a set of objects to a set of agents who can be assigned no more than one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pair need not be quasilinear. If the domain contains all classical preferences, we show that there is a...

We develop a model of monetary policy committee decision-making, building on the framework of games played through agents (GPTA). Interest groups seek to influence policy by offering action-contingent contracts to committee members. The resulting equilibrium admits a simple characterization and...

In a strategy-proof mechanism, implementation theory mostly assumes that each agent is rational in the sense that the agent reveals its true preference to induce its most preferred outcome. This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that the agent seeks such an outcome, but not necessary because...

This paper studies a continuous-time regulatory problem in which a firm holds persistent private information about demand and is subject to a flow limited-liability constraint. The regulator regulates prices through a dynamic mechanism that ensures truthful reporting of the evolving type....

We design optimal mechanism to collect revenues from nonrenewable resource exploitation, when the resource must be explored and discovered and when there is asymmetric information. The exploration effort may result in a discovery that is revealed only to the firm, and the effort is not observed...

We study how AI affects compensation and job design when performance depends on workers' non-contractible effort. In a principal–agent model with limited liability, AI reduces effort costs but disproportionately lowers the cost of achieving satisfactory performance. This raises the incentive...

Agency theory holds that managerial discretion over stakeholder decisions creates agency costs through altruistic redistribution. We test this claim in a principal-agent experiment where agents choose effort and transfers affecting a third party under unenforceable flat-wage contracts. We find...

This study aims to examine whether family firms differ from nonfamily firms in their propensity to save cash, particularly in response to new investment opportunities, and to assess how investors value the cash holdings of family versus nonfamily firms in light of potential agency concerns. The...

This article examines the EU-law challenges arising from the use of artificial intelligence for payment initiation and execution (“Payment Agents”) under European Union law. It focuses on Payment Agents that support purchasing workflows and are capable of initiating payments in both...

Performance-contingent pay raises productivity, yet in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) only about 16% of workers report receiving performance pay, with the incidence being roughly seven percentage points higher among university graduates than among non-graduates. This coexistence of low...

We examine how absolute and relative gains within reward schemes influence dishonesty. In our online experiment, we vary two payoff dimensions in a cheating mind game: the payoff level and the absolute payoff difference between being successful or not. A higher payoff level has a negative impact...

Renegotiation after software development is widely adopted by firms to mitigate uncertainties in IT outsourcing. This study examines the design and choice of fixed-price versus performance-based contracts in scenarios where firms may renegotiate software debugging time with the IT vendor after...

We use a stylized model of a dynamic innovation tournament to show that the effectiveness of monetary incentives depends on whether contestants receive cardinal, ordinal, or no information about their rival's performance. The model's main implication is that performance information acts as a...

Applying for benefits and programs can be so onerous that take-up is low even when support is crucial to people's lives. This study investigates how administrative burden and financial incentives influence the quality of the completion of an administrative task using an incentivized real-effort...

We study how AI affects compensation and job design when performance depends on workers' non-contractible effort. In a principal-agent model with limited liability, AI reduces effort costs but disproportionately lowers the cost of achieving satisfactory performance. This raises the incentive...

Casting mechanism design with evidence in the framework of Myerson (1982) implies that his generalized revelation principle directly applies, and we thus obtain standard notions of incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Their specific nature depends, however, on whether the presentation of...

The aim of this work is to analyze the factors that help companies avoid liquidation following the spirit of the Spanish insolvency law. This work focuses on the phase starting when companies file for bankruptcy and ending with the completion of the common phase. We apply the agency theory to...

We study a situation where physicians differing in their degree of altruism exert a diagnostic effort before deciding whether to test patients to determine the most appropriate treatment. The diagnostic effort generates an imperfect private signal of the patient’s type, while the test is...