We examine how absolute and relative gains within reward schemes influence dishonesty. In our online experiment, we vary two payoff dimensions in a cheating mind game: the payoff level and the absolute payoff difference between being successful or not. A higher payoff level has a negative impact...

Agency theory holds that managerial discretion over stakeholder decisions creates agency costs through altruistic redistribution. We test this claim in a principal-agent experiment where agents choose effort and transfers affecting a third party under unenforceable flat-wage contracts. We find...

We develop a model of monetary policy committee decision-making, building on the framework of games played through agents (GPTA). Interest groups seek to influence policy by offering action-contingent contracts to committee members. The resulting equilibrium admits a simple characterization and...

In a strategy-proof mechanism, implementation theory mostly assumes that each agent is rational in the sense that the agent reveals its true preference to induce its most preferred outcome. This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that the agent seeks such an outcome, but not necessary because...

Performance-contingent pay raises productivity, yet in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) only about 16% of workers report receiving performance pay, with the incidence being roughly seven percentage points higher among university graduates than among non-graduates. This coexistence of low...

This study aims to examine whether family firms differ from nonfamily firms in their propensity to save cash, particularly in response to new investment opportunities, and to assess how investors value the cash holdings of family versus nonfamily firms in light of potential agency concerns. The...

This article examines the EU-law challenges arising from the use of artificial intelligence for payment initiation and execution (“Payment Agents”) under European Union law. It focuses on Payment Agents that support purchasing workflows and are capable of initiating payments in both...

This paper studies a continuous-time regulatory problem in which a firm holds persistent private information about demand and is subject to a flow limited-liability constraint. The regulator regulates prices through a dynamic mechanism that ensures truthful reporting of the evolving type....

We design optimal mechanism to collect revenues from nonrenewable resource exploitation, when the resource must be explored and discovered and when there is asymmetric information. The exploration effort may result in a discovery that is revealed only to the firm, and the effort is not observed...

This study examines the factors that influence user trust in AI-powered digital agents within organizational contexts. Employing an integrated framework that combines the Expectation Confirmation Model and the Technology Acceptance Model, we investigated how user expectations, attitudes toward...

The growing compensation disparity between CEOs and employees has become a global concern, underscoring the need for regulatory measures to ensure fair and equitable remuneration practices. Drawing insights from China's government regulation of CEO compensation (GRCC) for state-owned enterprises...

In a model of asymmetric regulation, a firm can comply with two regulatory targets, and a regulator can audit the firm for compliance. Inspection by the regulator is imperfect, and it assesses the firm’s compliance with the targets with different success probabilities. The firm fully complies...

Overconfidence is a well-established behavioral bias that involves the overestimation of one's own capabilities. We introduce a model in which managers and agents exert effort in a joint production, after the manager decides on the allocation of the tasks. A rational manager tends to reduce...

Mainstream experimental economics is characterized by its focus on theory testing and "treatment effects" on aggregate outcomes. The "agentic" alternative is concerned with the econometric specification of individual behavior. In this essay, first, a literature review of agentic experimental...

This chapter surveys economic perspectives on the separation of powers, revealing how contemporary research in political economics and the economic analysis of law conceptualize and assess institutional checks on government authority. Emphasizing principal-agent theory, it unpacks how...