Welche neuen und bislang wenig beachteten Themen werden die Unternehmenskommunikation in Zukunft prägen? Der Communication Management Radar 2026 identifiziert interdisziplinäre Phänomene in Management, Technologie, Psychologie und Medien, die sich gerade konkretisieren und in naher Zukunft zu...

We study finite-player normal-form games with compact metric action spaces and bounded measurable payoffs. Our main theorem shows that every Nash equilibrium of such a game can be recovered as the limit, in the product weak topology, of Nash equilibria of finite games obtained by discretizing...

This paper develops a dynamic model in which the productivity of joint research governs strategic investment timing in innovation races. Departing from the standard assumption that discovery rates scale proportionally with the number of active firms, we allow research to exhibit decreasing or...

In perfectly competitive academic and idea markets, a divide emerges between elite scientists and the rest. The elite publish original, impactful work, while others - absurd heroes - struggle for recognition, often in vain. Though the original ideas game produces an equilibrium resembling...

This article reexamines the contexts in which Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values (1951) emerged, clarifying the often acknowledged yet unexplained influence of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. It situates Arrow's work within his training in logic and statistics in 1940s New York...

This study examines how large language models (LLMs) respond to varying stake sizes in the Dictator and Ultimatum games using the high-stakes design introduced by Andersen et al. (2011). We test ten leading LLMs chosen for their accessibility, prominence, and differences in reasoning...

This paper studies the assignment of a treatment by a social planner when the valuations of the treatment are interdependent across individuals in the population. Specifically, an individual's valuation of the treatment is influenced by the treatment status of some group of individuals and is...

This study models the auditor-client relationship as a strategic game shaped by two-sided information asymmetry and examines how this structure influences key audit outcomes, namely audit delay and audit fees, in Türkiye. Using a game-theoretic framework complemented by empirical analysis, the...

Wage dispersion and job-to-job mobility are central features of modern labour markets, yet canonical equilibrium search models with exogenous job-offer ladders struggle to jointly account for these facts and the magnitude of frictional wage inequality. We develop a continuous-time equilibrium...

This work addresses whether heterogeneity in player endowments influences investment decisions in common pool resource (CPR) games, shedding light on the relationship between inequality and economic decision making. We explore two theoretical avenues from behavioral economics-linear...

We develop a model of monetary policy committee decision-making, building on the framework of games played through agents (GPTA). Interest groups seek to influence policy by offering action-contingent contracts to committee members. The resulting equilibrium admits a simple characterization and...

This paper examines the potential for pre-play communication to shorten the duration of two-player incomplete-information wars of attrition. If players' types constitute costlessly verifiable information, then all types of players disclose their types, resulting in the war of attrition having...

There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer normal-form games. While counterfactual regret minimization and fictitious play are...

In a strategy-proof mechanism, implementation theory mostly assumes that each agent is rational in the sense that the agent reveals its true preference to induce its most preferred outcome. This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that the agent seeks such an outcome, but not necessary because...

This paper introduces a novel Payoff-Trolley dilemma task, where other participants' payoffs were at stake on the main or sidetrack in a trolley dilemma. Different scenarios varied the number of "others' payoffs" on the sidetrack and main track in ways that helped identify more clearly immoral...

This study critically and constructively assesses how 'economic games' contribute to climate policy research via a pre-registered systematic scoping review of 165 sources. Researchers use economic games as empirical tools to measure cooperation while experimentally controlling the presence,...

I study a formal mechanism that can sustain Pareto optimality in a new and very broad class of dilemma games. In the absence of a central authority that could enforce multilateral agreements, the mechanism is based on binding unilateral commitments, which condition a playerís (possibly...

We study games with incomplete information and characterize when a feasible outcome is Pareto efficient. Outcomes with excessive randomization are inefficient: generically, the total number of action profiles across states must be strictly less than the sum of the number of players and the...

To address climate change and fulfill its international commitments to reducing carbon emissions, China has accelerated the low-carbon transformation of the thermal power sector through a carbon trading mechanism. However, as the "30·60″ dual-carbon target approaches, the carbon market still...

This article provides a practical overview for applying the global games approach to solve models with multiple equilibria that are often used in discussions on fi- nancial and macroprudential policies. Global games offer a tractable approach to resolve multiple equilibria by introducing...

We replicate Horváth (2025), experimentally studying link formation and effort in a linear-quadratic game with positive externalities. Across five treatments, subjects exert 38-97 percent more effort than the Nash benchmark yet create too few links, depressing payoffs. In groups of five, the...

International environmental agreements (IEAs) often condition entry into force on ratification by a minimum number of countries, yet deep environmental commitments frequently face strong domestic political resistance. We study how IEA breadth, through minimum ratification thresholds (MRTs), and...

We study stability notions for networked many-to-many matching markets with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Outcomes are formulated as joint distributions over characteristics of agents and contract choices. Characteristics can lie in an arbitrary Polish space. We...

We develop a population game with heterogeneous infection-loss types and social-circle mediated prosociality, where altruists internalize expected infection losses within a setting-specific circle. Equilibrium admits closed-form cutoff rules and an aggregate non-vaccination rate that reduces to...