We develop an organizational governance model with a single buyer and endogenous upstream entry. Investments and control rights over assets and actions are immediately contractable; production is contractable after uncertainty resolves. We show the following: Supplier competition eliminates...

Schelling (1956) first clarified how power to reduce one’s freedom of choice might benefit a bargaining party. A commitment to reject proposals, when successful, may force concessions from opponents who otherwise might have an upper hand. This paper experimentally studies credible commitments...

Migration brings strong economic benefits in the short term and even greater long-term benefits as it contributes to innovation, investment and economic dynamism. The costs of additional migrants are borne by communities that feel pressure on local services, while the benefits are spread more...

This study provides an overview of the status of international climate negotiations ahead of the climate change conference in Belém, Brazil, in November 2025. It covers the key topics under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement. This document was...

This study provides an overview of the status of international climate negotiations ahead of the climate change conference in Belém, Brazil, in November 2025. It covers the key topics under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement. This document was...

This paper explains brinkmanship with infinitely repeated veto bargaining games, where players have private information. In the basic model, the paper solves for two types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. First, in Risk-Taking Equilibria (RTE), the proposer is more risk-seeking and engages in...

The enforcement of international sanctions is frequently undermined by multiple third-party sanction-breaking countries. This paper examines how a sanctioning country can optimally negotiate with several such loophole countries to close the enforcement gaps. We compare several sequential and...

We investigate how buyer-supplier communication affects procurement prices, comparing auctions without direct communication to negotiations allowing it. In controlled experiments involving students and procurement professionals, we find communication increases prices, disadvantaging buyers....

In many professional activities humans are getting better generation by generation. This is supposed to be the case, for instance, in sports and in science. Is it true in the arts? In this paper, we consider violinists from the time period in which audio and video recordings became possible....

Research has shown that negotiators sometimes misrepresent their emotions, and communicate a different emotion to opponents than they actually experience. Less is known about how people evaluate such negotiation tactics. Building on person perception literature, we investigated in three...

The recent salience of immigration as an issue among segments of the population in wealthy countries has often been understood as a product of tension between economic interests and cultural preferences. However, such explanations largely ignore differences in power between immigrant and native...

We study the design of efficient mechanisms under asymmetric awareness and information. Unawareness refers to the lack of conception rather than the lack of information. Assuming quasi-linear utilities and private values, we show that we can implement in conditional dominant strategies a social...

Producers can leverage their bargaining power vis-'a-vis consumers by entering bargaining with debt. We discover novel general-equilibrium effects of such strategic debt by developing a money-search framework featuring heterogeneous consumers. Debt distorts trade along two margins: it destroys...

We propose a standard search and bargaining model with divisible money, in which only the random matching market opens and the generalized Nash bargaining settles each trade. Assuming fixed production costs, we analytically characterize a tractable equilibrium, called a pay‐all equilibrium ,...

A war consists of multiple battles, yet the theoretical literature of International Relations has given little attention to how battles relate within a war. By integrating two ultimatum games with private information played by an Aggressor and a Defender, we develop bargaining models of war with...

This article bridges monopoly, monopsony, and countervailing power theories to analyze their welfare implications in a vertical supply chain. We develop a bilateral monopoly model with bargaining that accommodates upstream monopsony and downstream monopoly power. In equilibrium, the...