A Limit Theorem for Equilibria under Ambiguous Beliefs Correspondences
Previous literature shows that, in many different models, limits of equilibria of perturbed games are equilibria of the unperturbed game when the sequence of perturbed games converges to the unperturbed one in an appropriate sense. The question whether such limit property extends to the equilibrium notions in ambiguous games is not yet clear as it seems; in fact, previous literature shows that the extension fails in simple examples. The contribution in this paper is to show that the limit property holds for equilibria under ambiguous beliefs correspondences (presented by the authors in a previous paper). Key for our result is the sequential convergence assumption imposed on the sequence of beliefs correspondences. Counterexamples show why this assumption cannot be removed.
Year of publication: |
2011-11-28
|
---|---|
Authors: | Marco, Giuseppe De ; Romaniello, Maria |
Institutions: | Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) |
Subject: | Ambiguous games | beliefs correspondences | limit equilibria |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
On Games and Equilibria with Coherent Lower Expectations
Marco, Giuseppe De, (2015)
-
Variational Preferences and Equilibria in Games under Ambiguous Beliefs Correspondences
Marco, Giuseppe De, (2014)
-
Games Equilibria and the Variational Representation of Preferences
Marco, Giuseppe De, (2013)
- More ...