A revelation mechanism for soft information under moral hazard
Year of publication: |
October 2016
|
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Authors: | Roger, Guillaume |
Published in: |
Journal of public economic theory. - Malden, Mass. : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1097-3923, ZDB-ID 1468434-2. - Vol. 18.2016, 5, p. 752-763
|
Subject: | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Theorie | Theory |
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